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THE MARRIAGE OF RUTH

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THE SIMPLE story of the book of Ruth abounds in problems for which no final solution can ever be found, since the materials for their solution are denied us. On this village scene, so different in character from most of the scenes of those ungentle times, the curtain is half lifted. But only half. Naomi returns from her sojourn abroad, bringing her daughter-in-law with her, and Ruth goes out to glean in the harvest-field. Then unexpectedly we find Naomi possessed of land, and we are left to guess how it came into her possession, and what had happened to it during the years of her sojourn in Moab. We are not told the relationship of Boaz to Elimelech, or the relationship of the nearer kinsman; [1] nor are we told why the hand of Ruth went with the property. That the story of Ruth's marriage must be linked with the question of levirate marriage is generally agreed, though this is clearly not strictly a case of levirate marriage, since Boaz is not a brother-in-law or *levir*.[2] There are not wanting, indeed, those who draw a much sharper distinction between Ruth's marriage and levirate marriage, but to this we must return. Of levirate marriage in ancient Israel we know very little, and while the later scholasticism of the Talmud may preserve some ancient traditions, it cannot be implicitly trusted to throw light on customs which were already obsolete when the book of Ruth was written, needing to be explained to the reader as customs that formerly held in Israel.[3] We do not know when the book of Ruth was written, and widely differing

[1] Rashi, in his comment on Ru. iii. 12, conjectured that Elimelech was an uncle of Boaz, while the nearer kinsman was the brother of Elimelech. But this is no more than conjecture, found also in the Midrash Rabba.

[2] Cf. M. Burrows (J.B.L., lix, 1940, p. 23): 'The marriage of Boaz and Ruth presupposes a custom related to levirate marriage, but not quite the same.'

[3] Ru. iv. 7.

dates have been ascribed to it by modern critical scholars.[4] Nor is there any agreement as to the purpose of the book.[5] Some have regarded it as a tract of the fifth century B.C., written to oppose Nehemiah and Ezra, when they sought to root out foreign marriages from the Jews,[6] though it would be just as easy to read it as a defence of their policy against such as produced David's Moabite ancestress to discredit it.[7] It has little of the flavor of a political tract, however, and I cannot think of it as written for any such purpose.[8] To some its purpose is revealed in its closing verses, containing the genealogy of David,[9] while to others this genealogy

[4] According to the Talmud 'Samuel wrote his own book and Judges and Ruth' (T.B. Baba Bathra 14 b), and this has been followed in modern times by Cornely (Introductio in U.T. libros sacros, II i, 1897, pp. 233 f.). The book has been ascribed to the period of the early monarchy by Keil (Lehrbuch der hist.-kritisch Einleitung, 3rd ed., 1873, p. 437), Wright (The Book of Ruth in Hebrew, 1864, p. xliv — not later than David; modified later in his Introduction to the Old Testament, 1890, p. 126, to a date between David and the Exile), L. Fillion (in Vigouroux' Dictionnaire de la Bible, v, 1912, cols. 1275 f.), and Steinmueller (Companion to Scripture Studies, ii, 1942, p. 82); to a period between David and the Exile by Oettli (in Oettli and Meinhold, Die geschichtlichen Hagiographen und das Buch Daniel, 1889, pp. 215 f.) and Driver (Introduction to the Literature of the O.T., 9th ed., 1913, pp. 454 ff.); to the period of Hezekiah by S. Davidson (Introduction to the Old Testament, i, 1862, pp. 482 ff.) and Reuss (Littérature politique et polémique, 1879, pp. 26 f.); to the exilic period by Ewald (Geschichte des Volkes Israel, 3rd ed., 1864, p. 225), König (Einleitung in das A.T., 1893, p. 287), and Jepsen (T.S.K., cviii, 1937–8, p. 424); to the post-exilic period by Wellhausen (in Bleek's Einleitung in das A.T., 4th ed., 1878, pp. 204 f.), Bertholet (in Budde, Bertholet and Wildeboer, Die fünf Megilloth, 1898, pp. 49 ff.), Nowack (Richter, Ruth und Bücher Samuelis, 1902, pp. 180 f.), Cornill (Introduction to the Canonical Books of the O.T., E.T., 1907, pp. 254 f.), Steuernagel (Lehrbuch der Einleitung in das A.T., 1912, pp. 430 f.), Gautier (Introduction à l'A.T., ii, 3rd ed., 1939, p. 150), Sellin (Introduction to the O.T., E.T., 1923, p. 226 — the first years after the Return; cf. Einleitung in das A.T., 7th ed., 1935, p. 147 — in 4th century B.C.), Joüon (Ruth, 1924, pp. 12 f.), Meinhold (Einführung in das A.T., 3rd ed., 1932, pp. 336 f.), Oesterley and Robinson (Introduction to the Books of the O.T., 1934, p. 84), Eissfeldt (Einleitung in das A.T., 1934, pp. 542 f.), Pfeiffer (Introduction to the O.T., 1941, pp. 717 ff.).

[5] Cf. L. B. Wolfenson, 'The Purpose of the Book of Ruth,' in Bibliotheca Sacra, lxix, 1912, pp. 329 ff.

[6] So, e.g., by Bertholet (op. cit., pp. 52 ff.), Cornill (op. cit., p. 256), Sellin (Einleitung, 7th ed., p. 147), Meinhold (op. cit., p. 337). This view was proposed as long ago as 1816 by L. Bertholdt (Hist.-kritische Einleitung in sämmtliche Schriften des A. u. N. Ts, 1812–19, pp. 2356 f.; the passage is given in translation in Joüon, op. cit., p. 4).

[7] Cf. my Israel's Mission to the World, 1939, pp. 46 ff.

[8] Umbreit (T.S.K., vii, 1834, pp. 305 ff.) argued that its purpose was religious rather than political: 'Der Verf. wollte zeigen, wie selbst eine Fremde aus dem Gebiete der verhassten Moabiter gewürdigt werden konnte, Stammutter des grossen Königs David zu werden, weil sie zum Gotte Israels ein unbedingtes Vertrauen bewiesen.'

[9] Cf. Keil, op. cit., p. 437; L. Fillion, loc. cit., cols. 1280 f.

is a later addition, inconsistent with the earlier part of the book.[10] To Reuss its purpose was to demonstrate that in the line of David the inheritance of Judah and northern Israel became united, since Obed was the legal heir of the Ephraimite Mahlon, as well as the actual issue of the Judahite Boaz.[11] By most genuine historical worth is credited to the story, while Gunkel roundly declares that it is devoid of historical worth.[12] Into this tangle of problems, where we have so little to guide us, I enter with some diffidence, and can only hope to find a view which is consistent with what we learn elsewhere, and which is therefore possible. Moreover, the questions of the date and purpose of the book must be left undiscussed, since the limits of this paper allow no time for them.

Outside the book of Ruth the only passages in the Old Testament which deal with anything akin to levirate marriage are Gen. xxxviii and Deut. xxv. 5–10. It is significant that both of these are referred to, explicitly or implicitly, in the book of Ruth. There are specific references to Tamar and her son, while the incident of the drawing off of the shoe when Ruth was declined by her next-of-kin recalls the similar, though not identical, custom of Deut. xxv. 9. It is therefore not without reason that these three passages have been frequently considered together, and all probability is against those who differentiate Ruth's marriage from levirate marriage in kind, and not merely in the degree of relationship between Ruth and Boaz.[13]

[10] So, amongst many others, König, op. cit., p. 287; Bertholet, op. cit., pp. 68 f.; S. R. Driver, op. cit., pp. 455 f.; W. R. Smith, Encyclopaedia Biblica, iv, 1907, col. 4169; L. B. Wolfenson, The Book of Ruth, 1911, p. 9=A.J.S.L., xxvii, 1910–11, p. 293; Joüon, op. cit., p. 96; Burrows, J.B.L., lix, 1940, pp. 450. Wellhausen, on the other hand, thought that this genealogy was 'das wichtigste Merkmal der Zeit' (op. cit., p. 204).

[11] Op. cit., pp. 25 f. The assumption that Mahlon was an Ephraimite rests on the description of him as an Ephrathite in Ru. i. 2, and the evidence of Jg. xii. 5 that an Ephrathite means an Ephraimite. But Ru. i. 4 shows that Mahlon was of Bethlehem, which in Ru. iv. 11 is equated with Ephrath or Ephrathah, from which the gentilic is here derived. Cf. also Mic. v. 1 (E.V. 2).

[12] In R.G.G., v, 1913, col. 107 (2nd ed., iv, 1930, col. 2181): 'Die Erzählung enthält nichts Geschichtliches.' Cf. Gressmann (Die Anfänge Israels (S.A.T., I ii), 1914, p. 284), who declares that it is 'keine Geschichte, sondern Sage' and 'Novelle.'

[13] So S. R. Driver, Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Deuteronomy, 2nd ed., 1896, p. 285: 'The marriage of Bo'az and Ruth is not a Levirate-marriage: Bo'az . . . "purchases" her.' L. M. Epstein (Marriage Laws in the Bible and the Talmud, 1942, pp. 86 ff.) draws a sharp distinction between levirate marriage and *ge'ullah* marriage, with the latter of which he identifies the marriage of Ruth, the distinction

The Deuteronomic passage says nothing whatever about any more distant kinsman than a brother-in-law. Indeed, it limits the duty of taking the childless widow to a brother who has actually been living with the deceased brother, and *prima facie* this has no relevance to the case of Ruth.[14] On the other hand, Gen. xxxviii tells how Tamar, when she was denied her brother-in-law, managed to outwit her father-in-law, and became the mother of his children. That story seems to indicate that in ancient times the duty of raising children to bear the name of a dead kinsman was not strictly limited to a brother-in-law, but that failing him another kinsman might serve.[15] This would seem to be implied also by the book of Ruth. Neither Boaz nor the other kinsman was a brother of Ruth's husband, nor, apparently, a brother of Naomi's husband, Elimelech, yet some duty to raise children to the dead is implicit. Moreover, here again we find that if the next-of-kin declines the duty, then one farther removed may assume it, while both there and here the widow has some claim on the next-of-kin, or failing him on the next but one. In Deut. xxv, on the other hand, nothing whatever is said about anyone else taking over the duty.

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being that whereas in the former the widow remains in the same family household (operating only in the case of brothers living together), in the latter she goes over to another. Neufeld (Ancient Hebrew Marriage Laws, 1944, pp. 38 ff.) more soundly holds that the levirate duty is one of the Go'el's (sic! for Go'el's) responsibilities. Bewer (A.J.S.L., xix, 1902–3, pp. 143 ff.), while holding that the *ge'ullah* and the levirate were combined in the oldest times, thinks that in the book of Ruth the *ge'ullah* is not connected with the levirate. He eliminates the references to the levirate in the book of Ruth as interpolations (T.S.K., lxxvi, 1903, pp. 328 ff., 502 ff.), and is followed by Wolfenson (The Book of Ruth, p. 15 = A.J.S.L. xxvii, 1910–11, p. 299). Cf. also A.J.S.L., xx, 1903–4, pp. 202 ff., where Bewer maintains that the levirate interpolations were inserted by partisans of Nehemiah and Ezra to neutralize the effect of the book by their skilful suggestion that Boaz only married Ruth because he was by law compelled to do so. Bewer's suggestion is rejected by Burrows (J.B.L., lix, 1940, p. 450). Burrows also rejects the view of Koschaker, Gordon and Mittelmann that Ruth is inherited as part of the estate (ibid., p. 449). Of this there is no suggestion whatever. Ruth was in Bethlehem because she had chosen to come, not because she was part of the property at the disposal of another.

[14] Cf. preceding note, and Epstein's distinction between *ge'ullah* marriage and levirate marriage. But Deut. xxv. 5–10 cannot be treated as basic for the discussion of a usage which has its roots much farther back, and if, as is commonly held, that law restricted levirate marriage, it cannot be held that in earlier days a less restricted usage did not constitute levirate marriage.

[15] Cf. C. Lattey, The Book of Ruth, 1935, p. xxvi: 'The principle upon which Tamar acts, and which Judah acknowledges as just, seems to be that since the proper Goel, Judah's third son Shelah, is not allowed her, she has a right to the next Goel after him, Judah himself.'

There only the brother-in-law figures as accepting or declining the duty. Further, nothing is said in that passage of any property complications. That is probably, as will be said below, because ordinarily they would not arise.

That the Old Testament law of the levirate marriage arose out of a wider context is generally agreed, and, indeed, is beyond question. Comparable customs are found widely spread amongst men,[16] and the source and significance of the custom have been much discussed without yielding any agreed solution.[17] That polyandry or group marriage provides the basis of the custom has been maintained by some,[18] while others have connected it with ancestor worship,[19] and yet others have traced it to the conception of the woman as property, in which the family have secured rights which they are entitled to exploit.[20] Into any discussion of this I do not propose to go, save to say that the motives and ideas that gather round any custom are less simple than our tidy minds desire. Customs arise out of a complex situation, for life is always complex, and they are retained for a complex of reasons, though

[16] Cf. Westermarck, History of Human Marriage, iii, 5th ed., 1921, pp. 208 ff. note; J. Scheftelowitz, 'Die Leviratsehe,' in A.R.W., xviii, 1915, pp. 250 ff.; and, amongst older writers, F. Benary, De hebraeorum leviratu, 1835, pp. 31 ff.

[17] For recent reviews of the discussions cf. Epstein, op. cit., pp. 77 ff., and Neufeld, op. cit., pp. 23 ff.

[18] Cf. J. F. McLennan, Primitive Marriage, 1865, p. 204 (=Studies in Ancient History, 1886, pp. 112 f.): 'the only explanation that can be given . . . is that the law of succession was derived from polyandry' (cf. also The Patriarchal Theory, 1885, pp. 330 ff); J. G. Frazer, Folklore in the O.T., ii, 1919, p. 304: 'the two customs of the sororate and the levirate seem traceable to a common source in a form of group marriage.'

[19] Cf. Bertholet, Deuteronomium (KHC), 1899, p. 77; Margoliouth, in Hastings' E.R.E., i, 1908, pp. 448 f.

[20] Cf. I. Benzinger, Encyclopaedia Biblica, ii, 1901, col. 2675: 'Hebrew levirate marriage admits of sufficient explanation from the simple fact that in Hebrew baal-marriage wives in general are property that can be inherited.' Cf. also P. Koschaker, 'Die Eheformen bei den Indogermanen,' in Sonderheft des 11. Jahrgangs der Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht, 1937, pp. 77–140 b. (to which I have not had access), and 'Fratriarchat, Hausgemeinschaft und Mutterrecht in Keilschriftrechten,' in Z.A., xli, 1933, pp. 1 ff. (esp. p. 61); and Epstein, op. cit., p. 79: 'the two primitive concepts, that the woman is family property and that the childless person is cut off from the family tree and must be artificially regrafted, are the main motives transmitted to us . . ., and are in themselves sufficient to explain the origin of the levirate custom.' Burrows, in contrast to Benzinger, above cited, says: 'we may observe that, except among the Hebrews and perhaps the Canaanites, levirate marriage was not in the ancient Near East a means of securing a son for the dead. It was rather a part of the whole system of family relationships, authority, and inheritance' (B.A.S.O.R., 77, Feb. 1940, p. 15).

in different areas and ages different elements of the complex may be more prominent. So far as the Old Testament is concerned, polyandry or group marriage was no longer practised, ancestor worship survives only in a few disputed traces, and the conception of the woman as property belonging to the relatives nowhere appears. It is the widow's title to motherhood which is here prominent, and that only as the expression of her loyalty to her deceased husband.[21]

The comparison of the Israelite usage with that of her ancient neighbors,[22] of the Arabs of more recent times,[23] and of more

[21] The sole *raison d'être* of levirate marriage that appears in the Old Testament is the provision of an heir for the deceased. This has led Morgenstern to suggest that the origin of the practice in Israel was independent of that elsewhere. Cf. H.U.C.A., vii, 1930, pp. 161 f.: 'This is an altogether new motif, not without occasional, though not frequent, parallels in the marriage practice of other, non-Semitic peoples, but entirely without parallel in Semitic practice, at least so far as present evidence goes. It is this motif which is characteristically Israelite, and which indicates that the institution of levirate marriage must have had an independent development in Israel.' The re-interpretation and rationalization of older practice in terms congenial to the culture of the time is by no means uncommon, however.

[22] Cf. M. Burrows, 'The Ancient Oriental Background of Hebrew Levirate Marriage,' in B.A.S.O.R., 77, February 1940, pp. 2 ff., and 'Levirate Marriage in Israel,' in J.B.L., lix, 1940, pp. 23 ff.; also the same writer's Basis of Israelite Marriage, 1938; P. Koschaker, Quellenkritische Untersuchungen zu den "altassyrischen Gesetzen" (M.V.A.G., xxvi, No. 3), 1921, pp. 46 ff.; P. Cruveilhier, 'Le lévirat chez les hébreux et chez les assyriens,' in R.B., xxxiv, 1925, pp. 524 ff.; F. Hrozný, Code Hittite, 1922, pp. 146 f. (§ 193); Koschaker, 'Zum Levirat nach hethitischem Recht,' in Revue hittite et asianique, ii, 1932–4, pp. 77 ff.; I. M. Price, 'The so-called Levirate-marriage in Hittite and Assyrian Laws,' in Oriental Studies dedicated to Paul Haupt, 1926, pp. 268 ff.; C. H. Gordon, 'Parallèles nouziens aux lois et coutumes de l'A.T.' in R.B., xliv, 1935, pp. 34 ff. (esp. p. 37). In view of this widespread practice throughout Israel's *milieu*, it is impossible to accept the view of Geiger that the levirate was confined to Judah ('Die Leviratsehe, ihre Entstehung und Entwickelung,' in Jüdische Zeitschrift, i, 1862, pp. 19 ff.). It should be added that in Ras Shamra texts there are found occurrences of the expression *ybmt l'imm*, where the root from which the Hebrew יבם = brother-in-law appears, and where Albright renders *progenitress of the peoples* (Cf. B.A.S.O.R., 77, Feb. 1940, pp. 6 f.). This is held to show that the original meaning of the root was *procreate*, and hence that *brother-in-law* is a secondary limitation in Hebrew. Cf. Neufeld, op. cit., p. 23 n.

[23] Cf. Sale's note on Qur'an iv. 23 (The Koran, 1838 ed., pp. 57 f.), and Tabari's comment on the passage (cited and translated in W. R. Smith's Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia, 1903 ed., pp. 104 f.). Cf. also Muhammad Ali's comment on the passage (The Holy Qur-án, 2nd ed., 1920, p. 205 — text numbered iv. 19 in this edition), but contrast R. Bell's note (The Qur'ān, i, 1937, p. 71). Cf. too al-Bukhari's Ṣaḥīḥ lxv, on Sura iv. 6 (in L. Krehl, Receuil des traditions mahométanes par . . . el-Bokhâri, iii, 1868, p. 220): '(avant l'islamisme) lorsqu'un homme mourait, c'étaient ses héritiers qui avaient un privilège sur sa veuve. Ceux qui le voulaient l'épousaient; d'autres préféraient la marier à un tiers, et ceux qui le voulaient ne les mariaient pas du tout. Ils avaient plus de droits sur cette veuve que leurs propres parents' (Tr. of O. Houdas, Les traditions islamiques, iii, 1908, p. 295). For more modern times cf.

widely scattered peoples,[24] as well as the careful study of the Biblical passages which are relevant, makes it probable that the law of Deut. xxv. 5–10 reflects a limitation of something that was once wider in Israel, and this view is further supported when we look beyond the question of the childless widow [25] to the wider duties devolving on the next-of-kin.

The duty of blood revenge does not figure in the book of Ruth, but is found elsewhere in the Old Testament, and we find a steady limitation in Israel.[26] What seems in very ancient times to have been a duty falling on any member of the clan of a slain man to slay any member of the clan of the slayer,[27] was doubly limited in

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J. L. Burckhardt, Notes on the Bedouins and Wahábys, 1830, p. 64: 'If a young man leaves a widow, his brother generally offers to marry her; custom does not oblige him or her to make this match, nor can he prevent her from marrying another man. It seldom happens, however, that she refuses; for by such an union the family property is kept together'; or A. Jaussen, Coutumes des Arabes au pays de Moab, 1908, p. 48: 'En principe, elle (i.e. the widow) doit devenir la femme du frère du mari, qui a droit sur elle, et très souvent l'épouse. Si la veuve ne veut absolument pas, elle retourne chez son père.'

[24] The evidence from India contained in the Laws of Manu is frequently cited. There we learn that if a man died after betrothal to a maiden, his brother 'shall approach her once in each proper season until issue be had' (ix. 69 f.; tr. by E. Bühler in The Laws of Manu, in Sacred Books of the East, xxv, 1886, pp. 339 f.), though her consent must be obtained (ix. 97.; p. 344). Further, if a man is without issue, his brother or some other relation may be authorized to beget a son for him, but again it is emphatically stated that a single son is permitted (ix. 59 f.; pp. 337 f.). Here it is not clear whether this is permitted while the husband still lives, or only after his death, but the commentators follow the former interpretation. Further, it is laid down that 'he who takes care of his deceased brother's estate and of his widow, shall, after raising up a son for his brother, give that property even to that son' (ix. 146; p. 356. Cf. ix. 190; p. 369).

[25] It is probable that the Rabbis correctly interpret the Hebrew practice, in the later historical times at any rate, when they say that if the deceased left a child of either sex there should be no levirate marriage (cf. Epstein, op. cit., pp. 96 f.). From the time when a daughter was allowed to inherit this may have become the case, and 'son' in Deut. xxv. 5 may thus have had this wider interpretation. (In T. B. Baba Bathra 119 b, the law permitting daughters to inherit is based on the interpretation of 'son' in Deut. xxv. 5 in the sense of child of either sex.) In more ancient times it is likely that only a male heir would count (cf. I. I. Mattuck, in Studies in Jewish Literature issued in honor of Kaufmann Kohler, 1913, p. 211), and beyond the borders of Israel we find that even where there were male children levirate marriage was practised (cf. Joüon, The Book of Ruth, p. 9; and Cruveilhier, R.B., xxxiv, 1925, pp. 533 ff.). But in Israel levirate marriage was limited to the one purpose of raising an heir for the dead. Hence the emphasis is not on the childlessness of the widow, but of the deceased. It is not that she is entitled to motherhood for her own sake, but that her husband is entitled to an heir from her, if he has not already had one from her or from another wife.

[26] Cf. Pedersen, Israel I–II, 1926, pp. 395 ff.

[27] Cf. W. R. Smith, op. cit., p. 25: 'if the slayer and slain are of different kindred

Israel. It is probable that this obligation always rested with especial weight on the next-of-kin, and was always regarded as particularly fulfilled when it exacted the penalty of the slayer, but in the Old Testament, in the earliest sources of which we have knowledge, the duty of blood revenge was the specific duty only of the next-of-kin, and it was his duty to kill the slayer only.[28] Moreover a distinction is drawn between murder and homicide, and while the next-of-kin's right to slay the homicide is still allowed, there are areas of sanctuary where it is disallowed,[29] while in the Priestly Law there is a further temporal limitation. For there the death of the High Priest dissolves all blood feuds in cases of homicide, so that the homicide need no longer remain within the sanctuary.[30]

It is possible that there was a comparable limitation of the duty of raising an heir to the dead, so that what began as an obligation on the next-of-kin, or failing him on others in order of nearness of kin, was limited to the next-of-kin only, and to him only if he were a full brother.[31] The book of Ruth then preserves an older usage than the book of Deuteronomy prescribes.[32] This, of course, does not mean that the book of Ruth was written before the book of Deuteronomy, though neither does it exclude that possibility. It

groups a blood-feud at once arises, and the slain man may be avenged by any member of his own group on any member of the group of the slayer,' Cf. too S. R. Driver, in Encyclopaedia Biblica, ii, 1901, cols. 1746 f.; S. Nyström, Beduinentum und Jahwismus, 1946, pp. 11 f.

[28] Ex. xxi. 12 makes it clear that the penalty is to be exacted of the slayer only, but does not specify that only the next-of-kin of the slain is required to exact it. The Deuteronomic law (Deut. xix. 6, 12), with its reference to 'the avenger of blood' seems to imply that there is only one. 2 Sam. xiv. 7, in an account of the time of David, represents 'the whole family' as rising up, but this is in a case of fratricide, and therefore within a single family group, and the sequel again, xiv. 11, speaks only of 'the avenger of blood.'

[29] The altar in Ex. xxi. 14; cf. 1 Kgs i. 50, ii. 28 ff. Deut. xix. 1 ff. appoints cities of refuge, and so Num. xxxv. 9 ff. The two latter passages lay down provisions for adjudication, so that only the homicide and not the murderer may be given benefit of sanctuary.

[30] Num. xxxv. 25, 28.

[31] Bewer (A.J.S.L., xix, 1902–3, pp. 143 ff.) traces four stages in the development of the levirate.

[32] Driver and Miles (The Assyrian Laws, 1935, pp. 244 f.) hold that the book of Ruth represents an extension of levirate marriage from the brother-in-law to more distant kinsmen. So Morgenstern, H.U.C.A., vii, 1930, pp. 175 f. This seems most improbable. It is far more likely that what was once wider became narrowed to the brother-in-law, just as we know that in later times it was rarely practised at all, and the Talmud hedges the practice round in every way (cf. Epstein, op. cit., pp. 93 ff.).

but means that it may preserve a true tradition of pre-Deuteronomic conditions. And this it ought to do, if it narrates things that happened centuries before Deuteronomy was written.

Another duty of the next-of-kin was the duty of buying property that was in danger of being lost to the family by being sold outside. The law prescribing this duty is found in Lev. xxv. 25 ff., and we find in Jer. xxxii. 6 ff. an example of its operation. If the fortune of the original owner should improve, he was expected to recover the property by full purchase, and had the right thus to reclaim it even from an unrelated purchaser, while it was laid down that in any case it should revert to him in the year of jubilee. This law clearly rests on a conception of the wide solidarity of the family, comparable with that which lies behind the earliest form of blood revenge, and of the vicarious begetting of children to the dead. Moreover, the duty here laid down quite clearly comes into the question of Ruth's marriage.

Presumably the immediate brother was for all these purposes regarded as the normal next-of-kin. Upon him fell the duty of blood revenge; upon him fell the duty of buying in property in danger of being lost to the family; upon him fell the duty of begetting children to his deceased brother. If for any reason he declined any of these duties he incurred dishonor, and a more distant kinsman might then assume the duty.[33] Presumably the measure of stigma would be in direct ratio to the nearness of the relationship, and consequently custom would press less heavily on the more distant relations.[34] It is probable that in the absence of a brother the duty of blood revenge would be more pressing on a more distant relation than the duty of redeeming property, and there was no need to legislate for the case when the next-of-kin, whoever he was, should refuse. It is also probable that the duty of levirate marriage was regarded in historical times as the least pressing of the duties of the next-of-kin. Already when it first comes before us in the story of Judah, we find that it can be disregarded, and Tamar does not appeal to public opinion to bring

[33] In the case of the redemption of property this is stated explicitly in Lev. xxv. 45 f.

[34] Cf. H. Lesètre (in Vigouroux' Dictionnaire de la Bible, iv, 1908, col. 215): 'si les frères avaient à épouser la veuve de leur aîné défunt, l'obligation était étendue, à défaut de frères, aux parents les plus proches. Mais alors l'obligation s'imposait sans doute moins impérieusement.'

pressure to bear on Judah, but resorts to her own wits. If it could be disregarded where a brother was concerned, it is improbable that a more distant next-of-kin who disregarded it would suffer much discredit, and it may well be that Deuteronomy's failure to prescribe any alternative to a brother-in-law who should decline the duty was but a simple recognition of the fact that in practice few more distant next-of-kin would accept the duty. Deuteronomy's limitation of the *go'el* to the brother-in-law for this purpose, therefore, may have been less purposeful than a recognition that the custom was already beginning to fall into disfavor, and this is borne out by its prescription of the treatment of the brother-in-law who declines. Evidently refusal here was not regarded as something almost unthinkable.

That the measure of the stigma would be in direct ratio to the nearness of the relationship of the next-of-kin, even in the times when the duty was not regarded as limited to a brother-in-law, seems to me to give the true explanation of the difference of the ceremony of the drawing off of the shoe in Ruth and in Deuteronomy. In the latter the rejected widow publicly draws off the shoe of her brother-in-law and spits in his face; in the book of Ruth the widow is not even present, and while there is the drawing off of the shoe, there is no spitting. It is sometimes suggested that the book of Ruth reflects a later, and less crude, age than Deuteronomy, when the ceremony had been softened somewhat. This seems to me very improbable. A custom later than Deuteronomy, and yet obsolete before the book of Ruth was written, and needing to be explained, would carry us down far for the composition of the book of Ruth.[35] I think it is much more reasonable to suppose that long before the Deuteronomic age, the dishonor incurred by a more distant relation would be much less, and its lesser nature would be reflected in the modification of the ignominy of the ceremony.

The book of Ruth interprets the ceremony of the shoe as an ancient attestation in cases of redeeming and exchange, and commentators sometimes treat it as belonging to any contract for the

[35] Dennefeld (Introduction à l'A.T., 1935, p. 83) regards iv. 7 as a late gloss. The only reason for this supposition is apparently its embarrassment of the theory of the composition of the book in the age of David. In that, as in all matters, it is preferable to seek a theory which fits the facts rather than to bend the facts to a theory.

sale of property.[36] It is possible that this was so, but the book of Ruth provides no evidence of it. Its evidence only concerns a case of 'redeeming and exchange,' i.e. where a kinsman was involved, and where some measure of duty was being abandoned, and some right was being transferred to another. The drawing off of the shoe did not signify the purchase or sale of any property, for the kinsman neither bought nor sold anything. It was Boaz who bought of Naomi, and Boaz did not draw off a shoe in attestation of the purchase. The drawing off of the shoe here signified the abandonment of the obligation resting on the kinsman in respect of the property and in respect of Ruth, and it clearly opened the way for Boaz to do what he could not else have done. Parallels from India,[37] Egypt,[38] and the Nuzi texts [39] have been gathered to show that the shoe was a symbol of power [40] and of possession, and from Arabia [41] to match the association with a woman. The next-of-kin had not merely some duty towards Naomi and Ruth, however slight its measure might be owing to the distance of his relationship; he had also some rights and some power, until he voluntarily surrendered them.[42]

[36] Cf. A. R. S. Kennedy, The Book of Ruth, 1928, p. 57: 'It is purely symbolical, representing the transfer of a right, or of property, from one person to another. In Scotland the conveyance of land used to be similarly ratified by the seller handing a piece of turf to the purchaser'; G. A. Cooke, The Book of Ruth (Camb. Bible), 1918, p. 15: 'When *property was transferred*, as in the present case, to take off the sandal and hand it to the person in whose favour the transfer is made, gave a symbolic attestation to the act, and invested it with legal validity.' But no property was transferred; it remained in the hands of Naomi at this stage.

[37] Cf. the Ramayana, Book ii, Canto 112 (R. T. H. Griffith, The Rámáyan of Válmíki, 1915, pp. 265 f.), where Rama symbolizes his surrender of his authority to Bharat by giving him his sandals.

[38] Cf. Scheftelowitz, A. R. W., xviii, 1915, p. 255: 'Der Schuh gilt nämlich als Symbol des Rechts, des Besitzes. Schon bei den alten Aegyptern ist die Sandale das Symbol der Macht, der Herrschaft.'

[39] Cf. E. R. Lacheman (J.B.L., lvi, 1937, pp. 53 ff.), who explains Ru. iv. 7 f. by a Nuzi text, which shows that in a case of adoption the transfer of real estate was made more valid by lifting the foot from the property and placing the foot of the other party in it. Also E. A. Speiser (B.A.S.O.R., 77, Feb. 1940, pp. 15 ff.), who argues that shoes and garments were token payments to validate special transactions by lending them the appearance of normal business practice, and who applies this to Ru. iv. 7 and 1 Sam. xii. 3 (emended text), and also to Am. ii. 6.

[40] Cf. also Buttenwieser, The Psalms, 1938, pp. 75 f., where Psa. lx. 10 (E.V. 8) = Psa. cviii. 10 (E.V. 9) is explained in terms of the shoe as a symbol of domination.

[41] Burckhardt (op. cit., pp. 64 f.) says: 'If a man permits his cousin to marry a lover, or if a husband divorces his runaway wife, he usually says, "She was my slipper, I have cast her off".'

[42] Bewer (A.J.S.L., xix, 1902–3, p. 144) says that the drawing off of the shoe in

It is idle to speculate on the amount of the property Naomi had. It has been suggested that it may have been barely sufficient to maintain Naomi, and therefore insufficient to maintain Naomi and Ruth.[43] It may have been less or more than his. But it seems likely that the property was but a counter in the game, and that Boaz skilfully used it to secure his end. It is improbable that the property had been effectively occupied by Naomi since her return. For she arrived back at the beginning of the barley harvest, which had barely been gathered in by the time the story reaches its climax. It is unlikely that the usufruct of the property had been enjoyed by Elimelech and his heirs during the years of Naomi's sojourn in Moab, and probable that it had been farmed by other members of the family, who had enjoyed its fruits.[44] It may even have been that Naomi was unaware of her title to it, or that she would have been powerless to secure possession but for the support of Boaz. But Boaz knew of her legal right to it, and used it for his purpose. How she came to have this legal right escapes us, since we are not told elsewhere of the inheritance rights of widows without living children.[45] But that she had a title to an unspecified amount of property is quite clear.

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the case of the levirate signifies his renunciation of his right of inheritance. This is doubtful. As the next-of-kin he would seem to be the heir, but since it is his duty to beget an heir, he would forfeit the inheritance by performing the levirate duty. While it is improbable that a man who refused to perform the duty would be allowed to have the inheritance, he would lose it either way — unless the levirate union was not fruitful.

[43] Cf. Burrows, J. B. L., lix, 1940, p. 448.

[44] Burrows (ibid., p. 447) suggests that the property had been held in pledge by a friend.

[45] Num. xxvii. 1–11 shows that daughters could inherit in Israel when there were no sons. In Arabia the rule was anciently otherwise (cf. W. R. Smith, Kinship and Marriage, 1903, p. 117). But we are nowhere told of the wife's title to inherit in Israel, though in 2 Kgs viii. 1–6 we find a widow in possession — presumably in trust for her son. Neufeld (op. cit., p. 240 f.) suggests that Naomi may have been 'merely the executrix or trustee for the regulation of the succession of the legal heirs.' This is very improbable. Since there were no children of Elimelech, and even to Naomi a levirate marriage for herself or her daughters-in-law seemed out of the question, unless Naomi had some rights in the property the only heirs were Elimelech's relations. It is improbable that a woman who was, *ex hypothesi*, not herself one of the heirs would be given any authority over the legal heirs. Moreover, if this were all Naomi's right, why should the next-of-kin, who was then presumably the heir, be asked to buy the property of Naomi, and be ready to buy it before the question of taking Ruth arose? Clearly Naomi had some title of her own in the property. Jepsen (T.S.K., cviii, 1937–8, pp. 419 ff.) has suggested that the property was received by Naomi from her own family, and merely administered by Elimelech

The next-of-kin was entitled to the first refusal of this if Naomi for any reason was forced to sell; he was also the person who had the first responsibility to raise children by Ruth.[46] The two responsibilities were in themselves different. The one had relation to the estate of Elimelech; the other had relation to the widow of Elimelech's son. But since the same person was the nearest surviving relative of both, he could hardly accept the one without the other. Either he must play the part of the kinsman or he must not.

So far as the raising of children is concerned, there is no reference to property in the law of levirate marriage in Deuteronomy. But that is because the law did not contemplate the complication of a widowed mother-in-law as well. Where a man left property and a widow, the brother-in-law would not need to buy the property and marry the widow. He would marry the widow and the property would support her, until her child in due course became its heir, as the legal son of the deceased man. If the property were

during his lifetime, and since this would mean that the redeemer would have to be of Naomi's family he concludes that Naomi and Boaz were related. A similar view had been advanced by Caspari (N.K.Z., xix, 1908, pp. 115 ff.). This view is unlikely, and is not supported by Ru. iv. 3, 9. Bewer (A.J.S.L., xix, 1902–3, p. 148) finds in Naomi's possession of the property a 'very late mode of inheritance.' But we have no solid grounds for this assumption. Presumably a widow with minor sons administered the property for them until they were of age. It is unlikely that a widow who had reared sons to manhood would be treated with less honor. While it is improbable that a general title of widows to inherit prevailed in ancient Israel, we cannot assume from the book of Ruth that its author presumed such a title. It merely sets before us a widow of advanced age, who had fulfilled the function of motherhood, and who had outlived her husband and her married sons, inheriting her husband's property. To such a woman custom, which is the maker of law, may well have accorded rights. Nor can we exclude the possibility that Elimelech had willed the life interest in the property to her. For even where a woman had no title to inherit, a husband might have had power to will her a share in his estate. This was done in Nuzi texts (cf. E. A. Speiser, A.A.S.O.R., x, 1930, p. 19: 'the wife receives a life interest in whatever share is willed to her, the ultimate heirs being the sons'), and its possibility here cannot be excluded.

[46] Joüon (op. cit., p. 10) holds that Ruth only replaced Naomi because Naomi was too old to bear children. It is doubtless true that if Naomi had been younger the next-of-kin's first responsibility would have been to her and not to Ruth. But it is more doubtful if Joüon is right in saying that Ruth replaced Naomi legally just as Boaz replaced Elimelech. For Boaz replaced Elimelech as a blood relation, whereas Ruth was not of the same stock as Naomi. We must beware of linking the present case with one such as Leah's and Rachel's giving of their handmaids to bear for them. It was not as Naomi's handmaid that Ruth preserved the line of Elimelech, but as Mahlon's widow. Whoever was next-of-kin to Elimelech was also next-of-kin to Mahlon, but it was only in relation to the younger of these widows that levirate marriage could fulfil its purpose. Volz (T.L.Z., xxvi, 1901, cols. 348 f.) with still less reason suggests that in the original form of the story Naomi married Boaz.

insufficient the brother-in-law might have to supplement it for her support, but he would not have to buy her property from her and then support her as well. No great financial obligations would rest on the brother-in-law therefore,[47] and there was no need to treat of the property in the law of levirate marriage. But when the kinsman was confronted at once with the problem of redeeming Naomi's land and marrying a penniless Ruth, he was unable to face it. These were two separate and distinct responsibilities which fell upon him, either of which he could have contemplated separately, but not both together.[48] Yet he could not choose one and reject the other.

It is clear that Ruth's kinsman would have been ready to discharge his duty to her if it could have been done without loss, but he could not afford to 'spoil his inheritance.' Similarly he was prepared to buy Naomi's field, if that were all, since he would not thereby be impoverished. He would have to find the value of the land, but he would receive the land against it. No heir could be born to Elimelech to reclaim the land in due course, for Naomi was now childless, and any child that Ruth might have borne subsequently could not be regarded as Elimelech's heir unless born from a levirate marriage. But if he bought the land and also made Ruth a mother, he would be impoverished. For the land would revert to Ruth's child, as the heir of Elimelech, and he would be left with nothing in return for his outlay on Naomi's land.

It has been suggested that the duty of levirate marriage only fell on an unmarried brother, and that it never involved bigamy.[49]

[47] Burrows (J.B.L., lix, 1940, p. 29) notes that there is no indication as to what happened to the dead man's estate when the brother-in-law refused to take the widow, and suggests the possibility that the brother-in-law was then the legal heir. It seems inconceivable that he would be rewarded for his dishonor of his brother by the possession of that brother's estate.

[48] Burrows (ibid., p. 449) does not seem to me sufficiently to distinguish between these two things. He observes that Boaz 'acquires her along with the field, which he purchases as redeemer.' But Ruth was no more part of the property than was Orpah, and she is nowhere spoken of as property to be exploited by a purchaser, but as one to whom the next-of-kin owed a duty; moreover, his 'possession' of her was for one purpose and one purpose only, viz. the raising of seed to the dead.

[49] So Lesètre (loc. cit., col. 216): 'il est clair que le frère déjà marié était exempt du lévirat, autrement la loi eût prescrit la bigamie.' Cf. Lattey, op. cit., p. xxii. With this contrast the view of Cruveilhier (R. B., xxxiv, 1925, p. 544): 'Le Deutéronome ne specifie aucunement que le beau-frère doit être célibataire. Un tel silence autorise à croire que le lévir pouvait être marié. Nous pouvons même ajouter que générale-

This is highly improbable. The custom goes back to a pre-monogamous state of society, where no problem of this kind would arise.[50] Moreover, it is probable that levirate marriage was not normally thought of as marriage in the full sense. The woman was still considered as the wife of the dead man, and the brother was merely a substitute for him for a single purpose. Again, levirate marriage had reference only to a single birth. The brother-in-law had completed his duty when he had provided the dead with a single heir.[51] The Deuteronomic law says that the first-born reckoned as the heir of the dead man, and it is sometimes supposed that any succeeding children reckoned as those of the actual father.[52] This is very unlikely. Certainly if the brother-in-law were previously unmarried and the widow became his full wife, so that her first child was also his first child and the fruit of a legal marriage, it is almost unthinkable that such a child would not be his own heir. When the law of Deuteronomy speaks of the firstborn child it is not implied that the union would normally continue and that there would be other children who would not take the name of the dead man, but rather that levirate marriage was only concerned with a first birth.[53]

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ment il devait l'être, le mariage étant dans l'antiquité la condition normale de tous les adultes. On conçoit que pour le but à la fois élevé et pieux de procurer des enfants issus d'un sang fraternal, on n'ait point hésité à faire une brèche au principe monogame.' It is doubtful, however, if Cruveilhier is right in speaking of a monogamic rule at this time.

[50] A. Alt (Ursprünge des israelitischen Rechts, 1934, pp. 12–33) argues that the casuistic laws of Israel were of Canaanite origin. The Deuteronomic formulation of the law of levirate marriage is probably so far modified from any assumed Canaanite original that it is doubtful how far its form can be held to be Canaanite, but that the custom of levirate marriage had its roots in pre-Israelite practice is almost certain.

[51] Cf. the Indian practice cited above. Burrows (B.A.S.O.R., 77, Feb. 1940, pp. 5 f.) thinks the Hebrew practice was differentiated from the Indian in this respect. To the present writer this seems unlikely.

[52] Cf. Lattey, op. cit., p. xxvi. Lattey assumes that in levirate marriage the widow became the full legal wife of the kinsman, but that the first son was reckoned not as his, but as the dead man's, while succeeding sons were regarded as the issue of the second husband. If the woman had but one son by her second husband, this would mean that the latter would be left without legal issue, although he had a child born in legal wedlock. I cannot think this is in any way probable, and it is not supported by the book of Ruth, as will appear below.

[53] Where the levirate bridegroom was not previously married and the widow became his full wife, one would expect the first son to be both the real father's heir and also the legal heir of the deceased, while any succeeding children would be reckoned to the real father alone. Where, however, the levirate bridegroom already

If, now, Elimelech's next-of-kin were a married man with a family of his own,[54] it is easy to see how his own inheritance would be spoiled. He would have to use part of what ought to become his own children's inheritance to buy Naomi's property, and then restore that property to Ruth's child. It may be said that any addition to a man's family would reduce the patrimony of his existing children. Yet that did not ordinarily deter men from accepting family responsibilities amongst a people where a large family was regarded as one of the supreme blessings of life.[55] But here it is a case of a child who would not be reckoned as the real father's own, and the mulcting of his own children's estate for one who would be regarded as the heir of another. To beget children by Ruth without marring his estate the kinsman could have considered; to buy Naomi's land without taking Ruth he could also have considered. It was the bringing of these two things into relation with one another that made both impossible for him. And it was here that Boaz's resource became apparent.

Neufeld has suggested that from the very beginning Naomi set herself to secure Boaz for Ruth.[56] This is certainly not borne out by the book of Ruth, where it is said that it was Ruth's suggestion that she should go gleaning, and that it was by chance that she lit upon the piece of ground that Boaz's men were reaping. It was not until she returned home and reported to Naomi where she had gleaned that she even knew that Boaz was akin to her late husband, and it was only when Ruth reported the kindness of Boaz that Naomi thought of making a claim on him. Then Ruth was sent to claim the cover of his skirt. Again wider parallels are adduced to explain the symbolism of this act,[57] but it is quite clear that it implied both protection and union.

had children the case would be different, and an institution whose only *raison d'être* in Israel was to provide an heir for the dead would hardly function beyond the range of its purpose. It is not without significance to observe here that Judah, who was not himself childless, had no further relations with Tamar after she had once become pregnant.

[54] So Josephus, Antiquities, V ix. 4 (v. 334); also Targum on Ru. iv. 6. So, too, Morgenstern, H.U.C.A., vii, 1930, pp. 174 f.

[55] Cf. Pedersen, Israel I–II, 1926, pp. 204 ff.

[56] Op. cit., p. 37 n. Neufeld says 'it is clearly indicated that the fact that Ruth went to glean on the field was only the means employed by her to introduce herself to the notice of Boaz . . . in the hope of subsequent marriage with him.' He neglects to say where this is 'clearly' indicated.

[57] In the Arabic parallels to the levirate marriage above noted, the kinsman estab-

It is surprising that Naomi did not know at this stage that there was a nearer kinsman,[58] but Boaz knew, and knew also that great caution was necessary if he were to have Ruth. It is clear that he was attracted by her, and flattered that she should come to him. But it is also clear that the nearer kinsman had not alone a prior duty, but prior rights. And if Boaz had responded to Ruth's approach before he were given the first refusal, he would have had grounds of complaint, and perhaps worse. It will be remembered that in the case of Tamar, Judah proposed that she should be burnt as an adulteress.[59] Although she was a widow, living in her own father's house, she was still regarded as the wife of Judah's son, and Judah had power over her. Her defence was that she had gone to the next-but-one-of-kin, since the next-of-kin was withheld from her. But for Ruth to go to the next-but-one-of-kin without first seeking the next-of-kin was to commit a serious mistake, and to infringe his rights. When the Mishnah says that a deceased brother's wife acquires her freedom by *ḥaliṣah* or by the death of her brother-in-law,[60] it implies that to give herself to another before the loosing of the shoe was to commit adultery. In view of the case of Tamar this is probably right, and it would then imply

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lished his claim to the widow by throwing his garment over her. J. Lewy (R.H.R., cx, 1934, pp. 31 ff.) cites Assyrian evidence to show that the skirt of the garment stood for the personality of the wearer, and especially for his honor. Hence the symbolic action here invited would signify that Boaz extended the cover of his position and person to her. Cf. Deut. xxiii. 1 (E.V. xxii. 30), Ezk. xvi. 8.

[58] W. E. Staples (A.J.S.L., liv, 1937, pp. 62 ff.) maintains that Naomi knew that Boaz was not her next-of-kin. He translates Ru. ii. 20 'he is not our *go'el*,' instead of 'he is one of our kinsmen,' while Ru. iii. 12 becomes 'I am not really your *go'el*.' Despite the ingenuity with which these renderings are defended, they are not natural, and no attempt is made to convert Ru. iii. 9 into anything other than a simple statement of Ruth to Boaz that he was her *go'el*. The sincerity of Naomi and Ruth must then be impugned in the interests of these unnatural renderings, and the view is proposed that Ruth's visit to Boaz was to force the next-of-kin to take up his obligations or to renounce his rights. How a visit which had to be kept from his knowledge could force him to do anything is discreetly not shown. The story shows how his hand was forced precisely by suppressing the knowledge of this.

[59] Gen. xxxviii. 24. Cruveilhier (R.B., xxxiv, 1925, p. 527) describes Tamar's conduct as incest and a crime. That it was such by the standards of the time is most improbable. In many lands where levirate marriage is found the father-in-law takes the widow, and if in pre-Deuteronomic days the duty was not restricted to the brother-in-law, but extended to the next-of-kin, or failing him the next but one, it is hard to see where incest or crime comes in. This does not mean that we need go all the way with Gunkel in lauding Tamar (Die Urgeschichte und die Patriarchen (S.A.T., I i), 1911, pp. 256 f.).

[60] Kiddushin i. 1.

that in the days before the duty was limited in law or in practice to a brother-in-law, the next-of-kin must first release her or he could charge her with adultery. Presumably this was why Boaz cautioned Ruth to slip home quietly and very early in the morning, and to make sure that no one knew whither she had been.[61] If the nearer kinsman had had any idea that Boaz wanted to marry Ruth, he might have been ready to exploit the situation. And Boaz knew enough of human nature to guess what this might have meant. The kinsman might have needed inducing to renounce his claim, or even to withhold a charge of adultery against Ruth for what had already happened, so that his children's patrimony might have been not alone unimpaired, but substantially improved! Also Ruth was in real danger, and it needed all the resource of Boaz to cope wit . the situation. He kept his own desire for Ruth completely in the background, and appeared primarily as the economic benefactor of Naomi. Indeed, it was his master-stroke to intro-

[61] H. G. May (J.R.A.S., 1939, pp. 75 ff.) holds that Ruth's night interview with Boaz took place at the Bethlehem high place, and that relations between them occurred on that occasion. He finds some evidence of this in the six omers of barley which Boaz gave to Ruth, which he connects with the hire of a sacred prostitute, and believes that our present text has been purged. This reduces the insistence on the importance of seeing that no one knew of Ruth's visit to nonsense, since *ex hypothesi* Boaz would not be the only person celebrating the festal harvest rites at the shrine. It is unnecessary to rewrite a story which is consistent with itself in order to turn it into the account of something which is imposed upon it. In the same way it is entirely without evidence when May observes that 'Naomi and Ruth, as the source of the Davidic line, are represented according to the pattern of the mother-goddess who gives birth to a son who rules as divine king and brings prosperity to the land.' Of this there is no hint whatever in the book, and it is quite gratuitous to read it into it. Similarly with the further statement that 'this historical tradition of David's ancestry proclaimed the divine character of the Hebrew kingship by the mythological patterns which formed its literary structure.' W. E. Staples, who also quite gratuitously imposes a cultic interpretation on the book, denies that it has anything at all to do with David. He eliminates every reference to David as secondary, and assigns such historical basis as the book possesses to the period of Nebuchadrezzar. Elimelech is here made the dying god, and Naomi becomes the mother-goddess, whose devotee, or *ḳedeshah*, Ruth is (A.J.S.L., liii, 1936–7, pp. 145 ff.). To the present writer this seems completely fanciful, and the evidence offered of the flimsiest. The etymology of the name Bethlehem cannot establish that every incident that happened in the town must be cultic; nor can the etymology of the names of Elimelech and Naomi prove that this is a cultic story. Yet it is on such 'evidence' that Staples relies. On such principles much cultic significance could be found in the genealogies in the early chapters of 1 Chron. The unnamed kinsman is useless to Staples, and he therefore regards him as negligible, and says he adds nothing to the story. This neatly evades the issue why a cultic text should be burdened with what is cultically meaningless. Actually the nearer kinsman is anything but unimportant in the story.

duce the question of the land into the matter at all. Naomi may well not have thought of selling, but Boaz perceived that by bringing in the property he could place the next-of-kin in a real dilemma. And thus he manoeuvred him into a renunciation of his rights and duties,[62] and then dramatically assumed what the other had declined.

David has recently argued that the book of Ruth fails to understand levirate marriage.[63] He relies on Ru. i. 12 f., where Naomi says: 'Turn again, my daughters, go your way; for I am too old to have a husband. If I should say, I have a hope, if I should even have a husband to-night, and should also bear sons; would ye therefore tarry till they were grown?' David observes that if Naomi had married another husband, any sons she could have borne would not have been Elimelech's sons, and therefore they could not have been looked to to fill the rôle of brothers-in-law in connection with levirate marriage.[64] This is to press the passage too far. All that Naomi is saying is that it is beyond the bounds of possibility for her to provide them with substitutes for their dead husbands. She herself is already past child-bearing, and even though she were not, her children could be of no use to them, since they could not afford to wait so many years. Even if Elimelech had been still alive, this would have been so. How much more when he was dead, and when to Naomi's years there was added the further handicap of widowhood, and when therefore no levirate fathers of their children were even imaginable! Naomi is not implying that any children she might possibly have borne as the result of a new marriage contract with a husband unrelated to Elimelech could have been looked to, but stressing the complete impossibility of her providing them with fathers of their children. At this moment the idea of a levirate marriage for either herself

[62] J. Morgenstern (H.U.C.A., vii, 1930, p. 169), after saying (in my view incorrectly) that Ru. iv. 7 shows that the drawing off of the shoe was the symbol of the conclusion of a transfer of property, rightly observes: 'By the performance of this particular ceremony . . . she (i.e. the widow) had acquired her freedom and full control of her person from her brother-in-law; no longer did he have any authority over her, but she was now free to dispose of herself as she might choose.'

[63] Het Huwelijk van Ruth, 1941, pp. 7 f.; and Oudtestamentische Studiën, i, 1941–2, p. 58.

[64] It is possible that some reference to the story of Tamar lies in the suggestion of waiting for them to be grown up. Tamar had to wait some years for the brother-in-law who was then denied her; but to wait for unborn sons would be unthinkable!

or her daughters-in-law does not occur to her as a practical proposition. For her it was out of the question by reason of her age, as well as by reason of the fact that she knew of no likely relation, and even though it was not out of the question, it could be of no use to her daughters-in-law. For them, too, she does not contemplate a levirate marriage with a more distant relation than a brother-in-law, and it is obvious that though such a union was possible, it was most uncommon. Similarly the idea of such a thing did not occur to the next-of-kin until Boaz raised it.

By most who have treated of this theme Lev. xviii. 16 and xx. 21 are brought into the discussion. Not seldom they are cited to show that by the later law levirate marriage was regarded as incest. Thus Bewer says that Lev. xx. 21 was the final abrogation of the levirate.[65] More usually, however, it is held that that verse expresses the general rule, while Deut. xxv. 5–10 expresses the special exception.[66] On this view marriage with a sister-in-law is forbidden if she has been divorced, or if the brother has left living issue; it is ordained if he has died childless. It is not certain, indeed, that Lev. xx. 21 is thinking of marriage at all, and Bertholet maintains that it deals only with extra-marital relations.[67] While some of the provisions of the chapter certainly have to do with extra-marital relations, it is doubtful if this is so here.[68] But while later practice may have excluded marriage with a sister-in-law in general, whether it continued to allow levirate marriage for the specific and limited purpose of raising seed to a childless brother or not, we must beware of confusing levirate marriage ordinarily with full marriage. Apparently it neither required nor excluded full marriage, for whereas in the case of Tamar and Judah there was no marriage, in the case of Ruth and Boaz there clearly was. And these are the only two examples of marriage of this type that we have in the Old Testament. While Tamar's connection with Judah was legitimate for the purpose of obtaining offspring for her husband, it became illegitimate when it had achieved its purpose, and Tamar certainly did not become the full wife of Judah.

[65] Cf. A.J.S.L., xix, 1902–3, p. 144.

[66] So Lattey, op. cit., p. xxix; Epstein, op. cit., pp. 93 f. Cf. also Wechsler, in Jüdische Zeitschrift, i, 1862, pp. 257 f.

[67] Deuteronomium, 1898, p. 78.

[68] Cf. Paterson, in Hastings' D.B., iii, 1900, p. 269 b.

There is no evidence to show that in the case of the actual brother-in-law it either must have been full marriage, or ordinarily was such. Where it was such it must have functioned far beyond the purpose of providing a single heir for the deceased, yet that is the sole justification of the practice of which we have any record in the Old Testament. Yet in the case of Boaz and Ruth it would seem that there was full marriage. While this again was not strictly marriage with a brother-in-law, we cannot say that in such a case full marriage would have been excluded. Indeed, if in the case of a brother-in-law such marriage would have been excluded, it is hard to see how Ruth's marriage could have been brought within the framework of the levirate custom at all. The scanty evidence we have thus suggests that we ought to recognize a much greater degree of looseness than some writers allow. Levirate marriage was not in early times limited to a brother-in-law; it neither required nor excluded full marriage; it neither required nor excluded the unmarried condition of the levirate partner.

Finally, we come to Boaz himself. He was obviously a man of advancing years. He occupied a position of standing, and was a man of substance, yet he was flattered that Ruth should offer herself to him instead of seeking to attract one of the younger men of the village. Ruth was apparently an attractive young lady, who might be expected to secure a husband without difficulty, and without resorting to anything of the nature of levirate marriage. It was a mark of her loyalty to the family of her late husband that she preferred to bear an heir to Mahlon, rather than to remarry without relation to Mahlon's family, and a compliment to Boaz that she should prefer him to a younger man.

I think it very probable that Boaz was childless. It is improbable that he was a bachelor, since bachelors do not seem to have been common in Israel, and it is apparent that Boaz was well past the usual age of marriage. It is possible that his wife was dead, though the story is laid in an age when polygamy was common enough. But if Boaz was childless, much is clear that were else obscure. When Ruth bears a child Naomi is congratulated, and the child is treated as her child — i.e. as the child of her son Mahlon. This is in full accord with what Boaz had said to the nearer kinsman, when he had reminded him that in buying the

field he must also take Ruth,[69] and 'raise up the name of the dead upon his inheritance.' Ruth's child was manifestly regarded by a legal fiction as Mahlon's. Yet in the genealogy at the end of the book Ruth's child is just as clearly reckoned as the child of Boaz. It is because of this that it is often argued that the genealogy is a later appendix, presenting a point of view in conflict with the preceding narrative.[70] But this is not convincing. If the appendix is really in conflict with the story, it is surprising that the writer who added it was not aware of it. But is it? If Boaz had no child hitherto, then Ruth's first child would be the child of Mahlon by a legal fiction, and also the child of Boaz by actual paternity; and if Boaz had taken Ruth to be his legal wife, and had not merely played the part of kinsman, then the same child would be his heir as well as Mahlon's. Hence, not alone could Boaz afford to accept what the other kinsman had been forced to decline, since Boaz was a man of substance whose patrimony could easily carry the new responsibility; but also there would be no diminishing of that patrimony for any other son, since in Ruth's son the lines of Mahlon and Boaz would unite, and he would be the heir of both. There is thus no conflict on this view between the appendix and the preceding verses.

Nor does the case rest there alone. For even without the appendix this view is supported. When Boaz announced his intention to buy the property and to take Ruth, the people in the gate who witnessed his contract said: 'The Lord make the woman that is come into thine house like Rachel and Leah, which two did build the house of Israel; . . . and let thy house be like the house of Perez, whom Tamar bare unto Judah, of the seed which the Lord shall give thee of this young woman.' What could be clearer evidence that any child that Ruth should bear was regarded in advance as belonging to the family of Boaz? Here then, in the story itself, and not alone in the appendix, Ruth's child appears as belonging both to the family of Mahlon and to the family of Boaz.[71]

[69] Ru. iv. 5. Most editors recognize that the present Hebrew text (='thou must buy it also of Ruth the Moabitess') needs to be corrected by the change of a single letter, to yield 'also Ruth the Moabitess thou must acquire.' Cf. iv. 9.

[70] Cf. supra. That the genealogy was appended by another hand is likely enough, but not on this ground.

[71] This disproves such a statement as that of W. R. Smith (Encyclopaedia Biblica, iv, 1907, col. 4169): 'That the genealogy was borrowed from Chronicles and added

There is no need to deal surgically with the text to eliminate either of these points of view. Their combination would be both natural and inevitable if Boaz were childless when he married Ruth, so that she was at once his full wife and the widow of a kinsman, whom he was piously serving by taking into his home.

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to Ruth by a later hand seems certain, for the author of Ruth clearly recognizes that Obed was legally the son of Mahlon, *not of Boaz'* (italics mine). Cf. Burrows (J.B.L., lix, 1940, p. 450): 'Obed is not regarded as the son of Boaz except in the genealogy'; also Joüon (op. cit., p. 96): 'Dans la seconde généalogie, les mots *Booz engendra 'Obed*, ne sont pas dans l'esprit du récit, car ainsi le nom d'Elimèlek ne serait plus "prononcé en Israël".' Morgenstern (H.U.C.A., vii, 1930, p. 177) would delete Ru. iv. 11 b, 12, as well as the genealogy at the end of the chapter, but no reason for this is offered except its supposed conflict with the point of view of the rest of the book. He thus takes the opposite course to Bewer, who, as above noted, deletes as secondary every reference to levirate marriage for Ruth, in order to leave her child as the heir of Boaz and not of Mahlon, while F. Dijkema (Nieuw Theologisch Tijdschrift, xxiv, 1935, pp. 111 ff.) holds that Ru. iv. 17 b is an interpolation, and so abolishes both Obed and David from the book. It seems more satisfactory to seek a solution which can accommodate all the facts presented to us, rather than to impose our theory upon the facts by violence. In the present case such a theory does not seem hard to attain, and there is the less justification for violence.

THE SO-CALLED EPICLESIS IN HIPPOLYTUS

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THE SO-CALLED EPICLESIS IN HIPPOLYTUS

I

I SHOULD like to suggest that the rather innocent petition, "ut mittas spiritum tuum sanctum in oblationem," in the Anaphora of Hippolytus, is not a later interpolation.

In his valuable edition of the Apostolic Tradition,[1] Dom Gregory Dix has argued that the difficulties of the Latin text are satisfactorily solved by deleting this petition.[2] Much of his case rests on the fact that the Testamentum Domini omits the crucial clause; and it is in the light of this document that he attempts to reconstruct what Hippolytus wrote.

The Latin reads:

"Et petimus ut mittas spiritum tuum sanctum in oblationem sanctae ecclesiae in unum congregans des omnibus qui percipiunt sanctis in repletionem spiritus sancti ad confirmationem fidei in veritate ut te laudemus, etc."

Dom Dix well points out the crux of the grammatical problem: what are the objects of "congregans" and "des"? He then proceeds to reconstruct the original Greek thus:

ἀξιοῦμέν σε ὅπως δίδῳς πᾶσιν τοῖς μεταλαμβάνουσιν ἁγίοις ἑνοῦσθάι (σοι) εἰς πλήρωσιν πνεύματος ἁγίου κτλ.

There are five reasons why this seems to me improbable, to say the least:

(1) It does not explain how the phrase "in unum congregans" ever got misplaced before "des."

[1] The Apostolic Tradition (1937) pp. 75–9 (cited as A. T.); and see his articles in Theology vol. 28, pp. 125 ff; 187 ff; and vol. 29, pp. 287 ff.

[2] In his Shape of the Liturgy (1944) he suggests it is a fourth century interpolation, p. 158 n.



(2) It does not explain how "congregans" ever became an active participle instead of a passive infinitive.[3]

(3) It does not explain why such a literal translator as "L" should render "ἑνοῦσθαι" by three words, "in unum congregans." Why did he not use "adunari"? The Latin seems rather to presuppose εἰς ἓν συνάγων (cf. John 11.52; Didache 9.4).

(4) It does not explain what has happened to the "σοι," which the Testamentum Domini apparently read on this theory.

(5) It does not explain why a fourth century interpolator, enamoured of the Epiclesis, should have inserted such a poor one, which failed to pray for the transformation of the elements.

But what of the omission by the Testamentum Domini? Before we attempt to answer this dark problem, we must keep clearly in mind that deleting the phrase, "mittas . . . ecclesiae," does not solve any of the riddles of the Latin text. This could never have suffered such radical alteration through a simple addition. Were it merely a matter of an interpolation in a text presupposed by the Testament, we should have read something like this:

> "et petimus ut mittas spiritum tuum sanctum in oblationem sanctae ecclesiae, (et) des omnibus qui percipiunt tua sancta tibi adunari in repletionem, etc."

It is not, then, a question of approving of the Testament's reading because it solves the grammatical problems of the Latin text. On the contrary, it solves none of them; and if the compiler of the Testament is faithfully following Hippolytus, he has before him a Greek text which reflects something very different from what the Latin presupposes.

The Testamentum Domini [4] is a puzzling document. There are cases, as Dom Dix has so well brought out, where its readings are preferable, even to the Latin.[5] But there are other cases where the compiler of the Testament deliberately changes Hippolytus,

[3] For the infinitive construction with "dare" cf. A. T. 3. 4 (p. 5).

[4] The Testament of Our Lord, edited by Cooper and Maclean, 1902, cited as T. D.

[5] A. T., pp. lv ff; lxvi ff.

as in the omission of the Resurrection clause in the Creed (II. 8), to suit his peculiar view about the secrecy of this doctrine (II. 10). In the Consecration Prayer he has followed Hippolytus closely; but there are important deviations. When he meets a phrase which sounds harsh in the Greek, he substitutes something quite different to make the matter clearer.[6] When he wants to give point to his idea that the Eucharist is the offering of the Resurrection, he changes not only Hippolytus, but a traditional saying of the Lord Himself.[7] Finally, he omits the words of the cup, supplanting them by a theological statement derived from another part of the Apostolic Tradition.[8]

In the light of these facts, the author of the Testament is not to be trusted as following Hippolytus faithfully. He can change and omit when it suits his purpose, or even for no apparent reason.[9]

In the Consecration Prayer, this compiler deals with his material from Hippolytus in two ways. In the first place, when he makes significant omissions, he invariably compensates for them by adding something else. Whether this is original, or derived from another source, we can only guess. In either case we should expect him to substitute some relevant passage for his crucial omission.

A second way in which he handles his material is to break it up. Even in the middle of a sentence he inserts large paragraphs, which are suggested by a phrase of Hippolytus.[10] Later he returns to the rest of the sentence.

The sequence of thought in the compiler's Consecration Prayer seems to demand two things: first, that any petition for the descent of the Spirit should immediately follow the Anamnesis; and secondly, that the latter half of Hippolytus' petition (beginning "in unum congregans") should be related to the intercessions, which the Testament has inserted at the end. This latter half of the sentence in Hippolytus is a prayer for communicants

[6] "(Thy Word) inseparable" (A. T. 4. 5), must have been just as difficult in his Greek text as in the Latin. T. D. substitutes, "Son of (Thy) counsel and Son of Thy promise" (op. cit. p. 72).

[7] "You offer my resurrection," for, "You do my anamnesis" (A. T. 4. 10).

[8] A. T. 23. 1; T. D. p. 73.

[9] E.g. "gave it to His disciples" (T. D. p. 73), for, "giving thanks" (A. T. 4. 9).

[10] Cf. his treatment of A. T. 4. 4–5.

and culminates in the final doxology of the Anaphora. It is not surprising, therefore, that the compiler should use it to form the climax of his intercessions and to conclude his own Consecration Prayer. Though the text is corrupt, he follows it as best he can — almost word for word, and brings the doxology up to date.

But where is the first half of Hippolytus' petition? We must remember that the compiler is accustomed to break his material up, even in the middle of a sentence. There is no need, therefore, to look for the petition for the Spirit at the close of his Anaphora. Certainly it does not belong there, either in his Consecration Prayer or in any other. It belongs directly after the Anamnesis.

What, I think, the compiler has done is to substitute something entirely different, viz. a Thanksgiving, and an offering in kind, to the Trinity. This seems to be his idea of the nature of consecration, and (apart from the Trinitarian reference) it is surely the primitive one.[11] It is reflected again in his prayer over the first-fruits (II. 16). They are not blessed, but thanksgiving is made to God *for* them. What characterizes his Anaphora is that there is no "moment" of consecration at all. He is just as careless about the Words of Institution as he is about a hallowing by the Spirit. Consecration, for him, is an action of offering the bread and cup of the Resurrection, and of giving thanks to the Trinity.

It is indeed strange to meet this early conception, brushed up to suit the compiler's modern Trinitarian views, in a document as late as the fourth or fifth century. But the Testament is a somewhat bewildering work in any case. I am inclined to think its author had at least one other source besides Hippolytus for his Consecration Prayer, for it betrays not a few marks of a compiler's paste and scissors. He does a good deal more than merely farce Hippolytus. This source reveals some rather primitive features in other parts of his document, and may well be quite early. It is scarcely a Montanist work, but perhaps something like the Didache, with its stress on prophets and revelations.

In combining Hippolytus with this source the compiler has apparently chosen to follow the latter after the Anamnesis. Perhaps his own view of the work of the Holy Spirit has been partly re-

[11] Cf. Didache 9–10.

sponsible for this. While there are an undue number of references to the Spirit as bestowed on Christians, there is a signal silence, for a fourth or fifth century document, on the idea of the Spirit as sanctifying *things*.[12] There is no blessing of the font, for instance. Again, in the prayer over the oil, the Spirit is three times mentioned as enlightening and sanctifying the faithful, but He is not petitioned to come upon the oil or to hallow it.[13] Finally, even if there were no petition for the Spirit in Hippolytus' Anaphora, it is hard to understand why the compiler of the Testament would not have invented one, unless he were opposed to its theology. He invents plenty of other things to emphasize the new Trinitarianism; and by his time there can be little question that the typical Epiclesis was greatly in vogue as a result of the controversy. In short, the really difficult problem of the Testament is not so much the absence of Hippolytus' petition, as the absence of a full-fledged Epiclesis in trinitarian fashion.

The compiler, then, appears to have purposely refrained from using Hippolytus' petition in order to follow his earlier source.[14] The result is a perplexing mixture of fourth-fifth century theology and the most ancient form of consecration. This feature, how-

[12] Cf. Origen's view, De Princ. 1. 3. 5, 7; but, if the translation by Rufinus is to be trusted, this is not consistent with Hom. 13 in Lev. 6 ad fin., "the Holy Spirit by whom *everything* is hallowed that is holy." Consistency, however, is scarcely Origen's long suit.

[13] T. D. p. 78. The reference to the Holy Spirit in the words of administration of the Eucharist is no less bewildering than other things in T. D. It may partly be accounted for by the fact a Baptismal Eucharist is being described, and the compiler may be giving an unusual form, stressing the gift of the Spirit, for this reason (cf. A. T. 23. 7 ff. on the cups at the Paschal Eucharist). But whether the text is corrupt, and exactly what it means are dark questions indeed. It can scarcely involve the Syrian idea that the content of the Eucharist is "Spirit," since the compiler has no invocation of the Spirit, and his clear trinitarian doctrine precludes a deliberate confusion of the two Persons.

[14] One little peculiarity can be pointed out for what it is worth, viz. the transposition, "this drink and this food" (T. D. p. 74). The Anaphora of Our Lord has purposely changed the phrase to the familiar order. Can it be a mark of T. D.'s primitive source — presupposing the order "cup — bread," as in the Didache? The reason for this order in the Didache is perhaps the desire to transpose the offering of the cup from the end of the meal (as in Judaism) to the very beginning (as in cult libations). Cf. I Cor. 10. 16, where the parallel with the cults necessitates this order to make the point clear, though it does not indicate anything about Paul's manner of celebrating. The sentence in T. D. is unfortunately corrupt, and certainly did not make much sense to the compiler of the Anaphora of Our Lord. The reconstruction, however, which the editors of T. D. suggest (p. 173), sounds very reasonable, "We have brought this drink and this food to Thy Holiness."

ever, of blending the archaic with the modern, is elsewhere evident in his document.[15] It looks as if in striving to impress his readers both with the antiquity of his work and its modern orthodoxy, he alternated, with a good deal of confusion, between these two poles.

It seems, therefore, that we can sufficiently account for the Testament's omission of the prayer for the Spirit, without having recourse to the theory it is a later interpolation in Hippolytus.

II

What, then, did Hippolytus actually write? The Latin and Ethiopic texts, as well as the Ethiopic Anaphoras framed on the Apostolic Tradition, betray the fact that the Greek was early corrupted. Can it be restored?

Here we are in the realm of pure conjecture, but the Latin is literal enough for us to be fairly sure of the *words* Hippolytus used:

καὶ ἀξιοῦμέν σε ὅπως ἀποστείλῃς τὸ πνεῦμά σου τὸ ἅγιον ἐπὶ τὴν προσφόραν τῆς ἁγίας ἐκκλησίας εἰς ἓν συνάγων δίδῳς πᾶσιν τοῖς μετέχουσιν ἁγίοις εἰς πλήρωσιν πνεύματος ἁγίου πρὸς βεβαίωσιν πίστεως ἐν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἵνα κτλ.

I should reconstruct it thus:

καὶ ἀξιοῦμέν σε ὅπως ἀποστείλῃς τὸ πνεῦμά σου τὸ ἅγιον ἐπὶ τὴν προσφόραν, ‹καὶ› τὴν ἁγίαν ἐκκλησίαν εἰς ἓν συνάγων, δίδῳς πᾶσιν τοῖς μετέχουσιν ἅγια εἰς πλήρωσιν κτλ.

"and we pray Thee that Thou wouldest send Thy Holy Spirit on the oblation (and), uniting the Holy Church in one, wouldest grant to all communicants[16] Holy Things for filling them with Holy Spirit so as to strengthen their faith in the truth, in order that we may praise Thee, etc."

This reconstruction assumes that a "*καί*" has fallen out, and that case endings have been corrupted. Once the former had oc-

[15] E.g. for all his Trinitarianism, he still most frequently uses the ancient form of the doxology.

[16] For the absolute use of *μετέχειν* cf. 1 Cor. 9. 10; 10. 30. The absolute use of *μεταλαμβάνειν* seems much later, cf. Theophylact P. G. 123. col. 300.

curred, it would not have been hard for a scribe to make "ἐκκλησίαν" into a genitive, thinking it went with "προσφόραν." The corruption to "ἁγίοις" seems equally plausible by assimilation with "πᾶσιν τοῖς μετέχουσιν."

The prayer for the unity of the church in the Anaphora is as old as the Didache (9. 4), and eventually became expanded into the long intercessions we find in Cyril of Jerusalem, though an earlier form of these would seem to underlie the Testament. The many loaves collected on the altar may well have suggested the idea of the unity of the church; but the transitions of thought in Hippolytus (here as elsewhere) are somewhat difficult and abrupt.

This is only one of many possible ways of reconstructing the Greek, but none necessitates the radical deletion of "mittas . . . ecclesiae." To omit this clause, as I have tried to show, does not solve the main problems of the Latin text.

What the compiler of the Testament apparently did was to make the best of a bad sentence by reconstructing the second half of it in a somewhat high-handed manner. He made "συνάγων" into a passive infinitive, and supplied it with an indirect object "σοι." He made "ἁγίοις" the object of "μετέχουσιν" and added "σου." He added "and receive" for no apparent reason. Strangely enough this was somewhat uncharacteristic farcing. He generally had a good reason for his additions.

Facing the same textual problem, the compiler of the Apostolic Constitutions (8. 12) took a rather different line. He omitted those words which seemed to make no sense, i.e. "εἰς ἓν συνάγων," "δίδῳς" and "ἁγίοις." But he retained practically all the rest, though he changed some words and phrases to collate Hippolytus either with his other source or with the form of the Epiclesis with which he was familiar.

III

It is not possible here to enter into the large debate on the origins of the Epiclesis, and I have reserved a discussion of this for a further article.[17] It must suffice to point out that, apart from the archaic forms in the Didache and the Testament, all other

[17] Vide a recent issue of the Anglican Theological Review.

early Anaphoras contain some prayer for the hallowing of the elements. This conception is worked out in different ways by the various liturgies, but it is never omitted. Nor is it invariably related to the idea of transforming the elements into the Body and Blood of Christ. There were many "moments" of consecration in the early liturgies,[18] and, seeing that prayer was extempore, there must have been much repetition. No single phrase consecrated by itself, for consecrating was not a simple but a complex sacred action. It involved the giving of thanks, doing what the Lord had done, making the "antitype" of His Body and Blood, offering the bread and cup, and hallowing the elements. Indeed, the early liturgies are characterized not so much by a *moment* as a *movement* of consecration.

So far as this prayer of hallowing in Hippolytus is concerned, it seems to reflect the conception, which we meet especially in Syria,[19] that the content of the Eucharist is "Spirit." This, I think, is what he has in mind in the phrase, "in repletionem spiritus sancti," and why he prays for the descent of the Spirit. It is not to transform the elements into the "antitype" of the Body and Blood, but to fill them with hallowing power (or "Spirit") for the communicants. There is no need to suppose that this idea was confined to Syria, for there was sufficient confusion concerning the Logos and the Spirit in the early Church to account for its arising elsewhere.[20]

[18] Cf. Serapion, who attributes the change of the elements both to the Dominical Words and to the descent of the Logos.

[19] E.g. the prayer for the Spirit in Addai and Mari, and several references in Ephraem.

[20] Cf. the confusion in Serapion's prayer over the font (II. 7). There is an abrupt transition from a petition that the waters be filled with "Holy Spirit," to one for the descent of the Logos.

κερδαίνω AS A MISSIONARY TERM[1]

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It seems agreed that κερδαίνω in the sense of 'to win over an unbeliever to one's faith' (I Cor. 9.19–22, I Pet. 3.1) or 'to win back a sinner to the way of life required by his and your faith' (Matt. 18.15) is an *echter terminus technicus der Missionssprache*[2]; by which is meant, apparently, that there is no precedent for this sense of the word in either Hellenistic or Rabbinic language. I wish to suggest that this view is not correct; and that the use of κερδαίνω in the passages in question, while conceivably reflecting a specifically Christian trend, is in the main determined by the Rabbinic vocabulary.

It would be surprising if it were not. Clearly, this application of κερδαίνω is quite un-Greek. There is nothing remotely analogous in Liddell-Scott or the papyri: κερδαίνω in Greek means 'to profit,' 'to derive advantage,' 'to traffic,' not 'to win over somebody.' No Rabbinic parallels have so far been adduced; but surely, they ought to exist, for if there had been no Rabbinic influence, it is difficult to see how the New Testament writers should have come to employ the verb in a way neither classical nor vernacular.

It is true that the two better known Rabbinic terms for 'proselytizing' are not to the point. *qibbel* means 'to accept,' 'to receive,' not 'to gain'; it has no missionary fervor about it. *hiqribh* or *qerebh* has, but its proper meaning is 'to bring near,' different from the meaning of κερδαίνω.

However, three other terms are worth serious consideration.

I. *kanas*, *kenas*, *kenash*, 'to gather.' In the Old Testament, this verb means 'gathering wealth' in Ec. 2.8 (Qal.): 'I gathered me also silver and gold.' Compare 3.5, 'A time to cast away stones

[1] Read in Professor C. H. Dodd's Seminar on the New Testament at Cambridge.

[2] J. Weiss, Der erste Korintherbrief, 9th ed., 10th impr., 1925, p. 243; adopted by A. Schlier, κέρδος, κερδαίνω, in Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament, ed. G. Kittel, vol. III, 1938, p. 672.

and a time to gather stones.' It means 'gathering men' in Ez. 39.28 (Piel): 'I caused them to be led into captivity, but I have gathered them unto their own land.' Or Ps. 147.2 (Piel): 'The Lord gathereth together the outcasts of Israel.'

In Rabbinic literature, the verb continues to signify both 'to gather goods' (the Targum uses *kenash* in Ec. 2.8, just cited) and 'to gather men.' There are the familiar derivatives *kenesiyya* 'a gathering of people' (Mishnah Aboth 4.11); *beth-hakkeneseth*, meaning on the one hand 'a store-house for goods,' such as wood (Palestinian Baba Bathra 14c), on the other 'a synagogue' (M. Megillah 3.1); *keneseth-yiśra'el*, 'the congregation of Israel,' 'Ecclesia' (Cant. Rabba on 1.4); *keneseth haggĕdhola*, 'the Great Synagogue' (M. Aboth 1.1); and the Aramaic forms *kenisha'*, *kenishta'*. The verb also continues to signify 'the gathering of the diaspora.' The Targum on Ps. 147.2, cited above, says, 'He will gather (Qal. or Piel) the dispersed of Israel,' and the Midrash refers the text to the gathering of the diaspora, of the Ten Tribes, or of the excommunicated, people like Korah and his followers. Similarly, Midrash Ps. 70.1f. (Piel and Pual). The Mekilta on Ex. 14.31 ('And they believed in the Lord') remarks: 'The diaspora will be gathered (Hithpael) only as a reward of faith.' Compare the comment on 14.24 ('The Lord looked through a pillar of cloud'): 'When he gathers them again (Piel), he will gather them only by means of clouds.'

The term is used of 'the receiving, gathering in, of travellers.' The Jerusalemite Targum on Gen. 18.3 makes Abraham say, 'I shall receive the passers-by' (Qal.). *hakhnasath-'oreḥim*, 'the reception of travellers,' 'hospitality,' is a technical term (Babylonian Shabbath 127a), though I am not sure whether it was technical in the first century.

'To gather the diaspora,' 'the excommunicated,' 'the travellers' — to these uses must be added that occurring in the blessing which a father had, and still has, to recite at his son's circumcision (Bab. Shabbath 137b). 'Blessed art thou who hast commanded us to gather him (Hiphil) into the covenant of Abraham.' The bystanders take up just this word and respond: 'As he has been gathered (Niphal) into the covenant, so may he be gathered to Torah, nuptial canopy and good deeds.' (Why the verb was par-

ticularly suitable also for the response need not be discussed in this connection.)

But the verb is even directly used of 'the winning of proselytes.' For one thing, the familiar phrase 'to bring under the wings of the Shekinah,' though as a rule a rendering of *hiqribh* or *qerebh*, 'to bring near,' not infrequently stands for a form of *kanas*, 'to gather' (Qal, Piel, Hiphil). Gen. 12.5 says, 'And Abram took all the substance that they had acquired and the souls that they had gotten in Haran.' The Hebrew is *'aśu*, the souls they had 'made.' The Midrash (Sifre on Deut. 6.5) explains the curious expression by saying that he took the souls whom 'they had gathered' (Hiphil) under the wings of the Shekinah. Similarly, Lev. Rabba on 1.2 (Hiphil). The verb recurs in the famous utterance of Eleazar b. Pedath (2nd half of 3rd cent. A.D., though I am not entirely convinced that the text, which attributes the saying to the much earlier Eliezer b. Hyrcanus, must be corrupt — the latter's hostile remarks on proselytes as they are in reality do not prove that he may not have taken up a fundamentally positive attitude): 'God scattered Israel only in order that proselytes should be added to them; for Hos. 2.25 says, And I will sow her unto me in the earth; does any man sow a Seah (a small measure) unless in order to gather (Hiphil) many Korim (big measures)?' This is a good illustration of the scope of the verb, which, in the phrase 'to gather many Korim,' denotes 'the winning of riches' yet alludes to 'the winning of proselytes' at the same time. It may be noted that Rashi interprets I Chr. 22.2, 'And David commanded to gather the strangers,' as speaking of proselytes. If this goes back to an ancient Midrash, I have not been able to discover it. At least it shows that *kanas* suggests 'proselytizing' to a man like Rashi.

Finally, there is in the New Testament a close association between κερδαίνω in the sense of 'to win over' or 'to win back' and σῴζω, 'to save' (I Cor. 9.22, I Cor. 7.16 with I Pet. 3.1, Jam. 5.20 with Matt. 18.15). This is only to be expected; but it may be worth quoting a Rabbinic text where *kanas*, 'to gather,' appears as synonymous with *hiṣṣil*, 'to save' (Ec. Rabba on 5.6): 'Is. 38.2 says, Then Hezekiah (dangerously ill) turned toward the wall and prayed; according to R. Joshuah b. Levi (1st half of 3rd

cent. A.D.) he turned toward the wall of Rahab, saying, Lord of the Universe, Rahab has saved, *hiṣṣil*, only two souls for thee (the two spies she helped to escape, Josh. 2), and how many souls hast thou saved, *hiṣṣil*, for her (all her family were spared, Josh. 6.25) — my fathers have gathered, *kanas* or *kinnes*, for thee all the proselytes, how much the more (sc. shouldest thou save me from death)!'

II. *qana, qene.* This is the usual verb, both in the Old Testament and in Rabbinic writings, for 'to buy,' 'to acquire,' though when used with God as subject, it may also mean 'to found,' 'to create.' It is the usual verb for 'to buy goods,' 'to acquire goods,' but it denotes 'the winning of men' e.g. in Sir. 6.7, 'If thou gainest a friend, gain him by trial,' or M. Aboth 1.6, 'Joshua b. Perahyah (2nd half of 2nd cent. B.C.) says, Gain thee a fellow-disciple.' Compare M. Aboth 4.11.

The verb occurs in a maxim somewhat simliar to Matt. 16.26, which latter emphasizes the disappointment of a man 'if he shall gain, κερδαίνω, the whole world and lose his soul.' We are told (Bab. Nedarim 41a): 'In Palestine they say, If a man has gained knowledge, what does he lack? If he has not gained that, what has he gained?'

I can find no straightforward application of the verb to 'proselytizing,' and while this may be due to an oversight, it is clear that the verb is not prominent in that connection. The nearest I found is Gen. Rabba on 14.19, 'Blessed be thou of the most high God, creator — or possessor, acquirer, the verb being *qone* — of heaven and earth.' R. Isaac (2nd half of 3rd cent. A.D.) takes 'creator of heaven and earth' as an attribute of Abraham and explains that, as he converted people to monotheism, God regarded him as his partner in the creation. *qone*, then, is here interpreted as 'creator,' but there may be a pun on the sense of 'gainer,' 'converter.' The same pun may underlie M. Aboth 6.10, saying that Abraham is called a special possession of God in Gen. 14.19: God 'possesses,' or, if this pun is intended, 'converts,' Abraham. (That Abraham was the first proselyte is a well-known idea of the Midrash; see Bab. Sukkah 49b.). Possibly, an allusion to proselytizing is contained also in the words addressed by God to Gabriel, *qene lekha 'edha*, 'found — or, gain — thee a congregation'

(Bab. Pesahim 118b). But if so, it is remote, and in any case, the passage is obscure. On the other hand, a text like Sifre on Nu. 10.29 does not belong here, since it is the proselyte who 'gains God,' not God or the faithful who gains the proselyte: Jethro, the Midrash says, is described as a Kenite *sheqqana shamayim wa'areṣ*, 'because he gained heaven and earth.' Compare Bab. Nedarim 41a, already quoted, on 'gaining knowledge'; and M. Aboth 2.7, 'Hillel used to say, If a man has gained words of the Law, he has gained life in the world to come.'

III. These verbs, then, *kanas* and *qana*, were used with reference to both 'the acquiring of wealth' and 'the gaining of men'; and the former at least was definitely a missionary term. It must be conceded, therefore, that they may have helped to prepare the ground for the use of a term like κερδαίνω in the manner indicated. Yet they do not fully account for the use of precisely this word. If there had been these two verbs only, the writers in Greek would no doubt have had a good enough vocabulary to choose one of the Greek verbs meaning 'to gather,' with the same basic sense as *kanas*, or meaning 'to buy,' 'to acquire,' with the same basic sense as *qana*. Therefore, while assigning a certain general role to *kanas* and *qana* in the set of notions underlying the use of κερδαίνω, I consider a third verb as the one of which κερδαίνω is an immediate translation: namely *śakhar* or, in the forms more common in texts here relevant, *niśkar* and *hiśtakker*. I am afraid my evidence that this is the term behind κερδαίνω is slightly less strong than my conviction: I shall point out a gap — not very serious, I think — in my argument. Here are the principal points.

First, the general meaning and range of the term in Rabbinic language, and the way in which it can be applied, are highly reminiscent of κερδαίνω. The noun *śakhar* signifies 'wages,' 'profit,' 'advantage,' *'lucrum'*; it can be employed exactly like κέρδος. M. Baba Metzia 5.4 reads: 'None may set up a shopkeeper on the condition of receiving half the profit.' Of a more spiritual kind is God, the Torah or Wisdom as *śakhar* of the pious, a notion to be found as early as in Gen. 15.1: 'I am thy exceeding great reward.' So the Christian's κέρδος is Christ: Phil. 3.7f. M. Aboth 5.11 speaks of various characters: of one, easy to provoke and easy to appease, we are told that 'his loss is cancelled by

his gain.' It is to be noted that the regular opposite of *śakhar*, 'profit,' *hephsedh*, 'loss,' which occurs in this saying, exactly corresponds to ζημία, the regular opposite of κέρδος; and the regular opposite of the verb *niśkar* or *hiśtakker*, 'to profit,' *hiphsidh* or *niphsadh*, 'to suffer loss,' corresponds to ζημιοῦμαι, the opposite of κερδαίνω. Phil. 3.7f., just mentioned, says: 'But what things were gains, κέρδος, to me, I counted loss, ζημία; I count all things loss, ζημία, for Christ, for whom I have lost all things, ζημιοῦμαι, that I may win Christ, κερδαίνω.' Philo, De Spec. Leg. 2.87, gives as a reason for the Seventh Year: 'Do not be entirely under the power of lucre, κέρδος, but submit voluntarily to some loss, ζημία.' To quote a few more examples from the Rabbis, M. Aboth 2.1 brings a saying of Judah the Prince: 'Reckon the loss (material loss) resulting from a precept against its reward (from God), and the reward (material) resulting from a transgression against its loss (from God).' Bab. Pesahim 50b: 'Some are industrious and gain (Niphal) — namely, those working all the week but not on the eve of the Sabbath — and some are industrious and lose — namely, those working also on the eve of the Sabbath.' Or take M. Ketuboth 13.3, 'Admon (1st cent. A.D.) says, Must I suffer loss because I am a male (the sons not inheriting if there is only enough to maintain the daughters)?,' with 10.5, 'Ben Nanos (1st half of 2nd cent. A.D.) says, And should she profit (Niphal) because she is the last (if a man dies, should the wife he married last not have to swear when claiming her jointure)?' Instead of *śakhar*, we occasionally find its Aramaic equivalent *'aghar*, *'aghra'*, contrasted with *hephsedh*. Bab. Baba Metzia 68b: 'A bond was issued against the children of R. Ilish, stipulating half profits and half loss.'

Secondly, Symmachus has κέρδος for *śakhar* in Ec. 4.9: 'Two are better than one, because they have a good reward for their labour.' It should be observed that the LXX does not use κερδαίνω and κέρδος at all, commonly rendering *śakhar* by μισθός. The reason, I think, is not far to seek. In the Old Testament, *śakhar* and its derivatives have not yet attained the range of κερδαίνω; μισθός and μισθοῦμαι more or less cover the ground; nor is there any other synonym of κερδαίνω. How far the development had gone by the time of the LXX, it is impossible to say. When Sym-

machus wrote, it was certainly completed, and the translation of *śakhar* by κέρδος, in a verse where it plainly does not mean μισθός in its narrower sense, must now have appeared quite natural.

Thirdly, as for the verb, *niśkar* or *hiśtakker*, quite apart from its relation to *hiphsidh*, *niphsadh*, ζημιοῦμαι, already discussed, it might be rendered by κερδαίνω in a great many cases. It means 'to be at an advantage' e.g. in M. Baba Kamma 4.1 (Niphal), where R. Meir (middle of 2nd cent. A.D.) decides that if an ox gores several oxen, the claim of the owner of the last takes precedence: the owner of the last 'is at an advantage.' A principle frequently operating is that the law must be formulated in such a way that a sinner or dishonest person should not 'profit,' 'be at an advantage.' The dough-offering is less if dough becomes unclean; but if a woman intentionally renders the dough unclean, the normal amount is due as offering, in order that the sinner 'shall not profit' (Niphal): M. Hallah 2.7. Compare M. Shebiith 9.9 Bab. Yebamoth 92b. (As a matter of fact, here also the opposite *hiphsidh* occurs. In M. Baba Metzia 3.4f. R. Jose — middle of 2nd cent. A.D. — rejects certain decisions because, if they were law, 'what loss would the deceiver suffer?' This argument is manifestly allied with the one that the sinner 'must make no profit.') Again, the verb means 'to benefit by a thing' in Tanhuma Vayyeshebh 13 on Gen. 38.1: 'Jacob benefited by, derived advantage from, his flock' (Hithpael), getting the milk and wool. Or in Bab. Pesahim 54b: 'No man knows by which enterprise he will profit' (Hithpael). Or in M. Erubin 3.6. It may even signify, like κερδαίνω, 'to deal in,' 'to traffic.' M. Shekalim 4.3: With the surplus of the Shekel-chamber R. Ishmael (1st half of 2nd cent. A.D.) held that wine and the like should be bought, to be resold to those wishing to bring a private offering, and 'the profit,' *śakhar*, to go to the Temple; while R. Akiba (same period) was of opinion that 'one should not traffic' (Hithpael) with what belongs to the Temple. Compare Bab. Baba Bathra 91a. How established this scope of the verb is may be seen from the fact that in the popular, modern dictionaries *niśkar* and *hiśtakker* are listed as denoting 'to earn,' 'to profit,' or, in German, '*verdienen*,' '*profitieren*,'[3] values precisely equivalent to κερδαίνω.

[3] See I. Raffalovitch, Anglo-Hebrew Modern Dictionary, s.vv. 'earn' and 'profit,' and M. D. Gross, Hamilton Hashalem, part I (Hebrew-German), s.v. *śakhar*.

Fourthly, in a passage given by Strack-Billerbeck as parallel to Matt. 16.26, *hiśtakker* takes the place of κερδαίνω. (Another text comparable to Matt. 16.26, and using *qana*, was adduced above.) According to Tosefta Maaser Sheni 3.18, Simeon b. Gamaliel, Judah and Jose (all middle of 2nd cent. A.D.) said to a man who did not pay his tithes properly: 'Thou hast gained money but destroyed — or lost, *'ibbedh* — souls.' It is easy to see why, in this connection, *'ibbedh*, 'to destroy,' 'to lose,' may be opposed to *hiśtakker*: the meaning of *'ibbedh* is here exactly that of *hiphsidh*. Nevertheless, *hiphsidh* actually occurs in what is obviously the earlier version of the saying, though Strack-Billerbeck do not mention it. M. Yadaim 4.3 records that R. Eleazar b. Azariah (1st half of 2nd cent. A.D.), arguing against the exemption of certain groups from certain tithes, exclaimed: 'Lo, thou art as one that would make them enjoy worldly riches (*hinna mamon*), yet thou art but as one that would lose souls.' It is also worth remarking that ζημιοῦμαι is similarly replaceable in Greek. We find 'He that committeth fornication is not aware when he suffers loss, ζημιοῦμαι,' in the Testament of Judah 15.1, but 'Many hath fornication destroyed, ἀπόλλυμι,' in the Testament of Reuben 4.7.

Fifthly and lastly, there is a series of more important texts in which the verb refers to 'the winning of men.' Midrash Ps. comments on 103.9, 'He will not always chide.' The Hebrew for 'always,' *laneṣaḥ*, is declared to mean 'for conquest,' so that the verse signifies 'He will not chide for conquest,' and God is represented as saying: 'Did I not contend with the generation of the Flood, and I conquered and suffered loss (*hiphsidh*, ζημιοῦμαι)? But when Moses conquered me (obtaining forgiveness for the people after the incident of the Golden Calf), I gained profit (Hithpael) in my world. Hence, He will not chide for conquest.' In Pesikta Rabbati 166b, the main idea is given in a more general form, by Resh Lakish (middle of 3rd cent. A.D.): 'God says, When I conquer I suffer loss (*hiphsidh*), but when I am conquered I gain (Hithpael). I conquered dealing with the generation of the Flood, but I lost (*hiphsidh*), for I destroyed all those masses. But when the Golden Calf was made, Moses conquered me, and I gained (Hithpael) all those masses.' The word for 'masses,' incidentally,

is *'okhloza'*, the Greek ὄχλος. In Pesikta Rabbati 32b–33a, the idea is propounded in connection with Is. 57.16, 'For he will not be wroth for conquest' (*laneṣaḥ* being taken in this sense instead of its real meaning, 'for always'), and reference is made to Ps. 4.1, beginning 'To the chief musician,' *lamenaṣeaḥ*, which word is interpreted as 'To him who rejoices when they conquer him.' An earlier trace of this tradition may be found in Bab. Pesahim 119a; where, in the name of R. Ishmael b. Jose (contemporary of Judah the Prince), we are offered the same interpretation of the title of Ps. 4, *lamenaṣeaḥ*, and told that Ps. 106.23 furnishes support: 'He said he would destroy them, had not Moses stood in the breach to turn away his wrath.'

I believe that *niśkar* or *hiśtakker*, meaning 'the making of a profit' and meaning 'the gaining by God of men whom he had cast away,' accounts for the use of κερδαίνω as a missionary term in the New Testament. I cannot, indeed, affirm that the Rabbis used their term of 'proselytizing.' I have not found it in that field; it is certainly not frequent there; and this particular direction may still be Christian, though I do not think so. Here is the gap in my argument, which I announced above: the masses which God 'gains' in the chain of texts just examined are Israelites condemned and reprieved, 'won back,' not Gentiles 'won over.' But it is not a serious gap, as three considerations will show. In the first place, in Matt. 15.18 at any rate, κερδαίνω denotes, not the 'winning over of proselytes,' but the 'winning back of a sinner,' just as does the Rabbinic word in Midrash Ps. on 103.9 and Pesikta Rabbati 166b. For this application, then, the evidence leaves nothing to be desired. In the second place, in one saying at least, the Aramaic equivalent of *śakhar*, i.e. *'aghar*, to which I have referred before, is employed in a manner all but positive proof that proselytes proper, won over from another faith, might be described by this term. It is an early saying, in Pal. Baba Metzia 8c, by Simeon b. Shatah (1st half of 1st cent. B.C.). He refused to regard as his own a pearl found in an ass that had been bought for him from an Arab, declaring that he was no *barbari*, βάρβαρος, and that he preferred hearing the Arab say 'Blessed be the God of the Jews' (sc. whose followers are so honest) to all *'aghar*, 'gain,' of this world. Surely, where such an expression was possible, it

was also possible to 'gain a proselyte.' It is perhaps not superfluous to recall, to justify my assessment of the story, that in an age when one might be recognized as belonging to a faith though very loosely attached to it, making a Gentile praise God did constitute a kind of proselytizing. This appears from numerous Rabbinic statements. In the New Testament, Matt. 5.16, 'Let your light so shine before men, that they may see your good works, and glorify your Father,' is as suggestive a text as any. How near 'glorifying' is to 'being won over' may be illustrated by a comparison of I Pet. 2.12, 'Having your conversation honest among Gentiles, that they may by your good works, which they shall behold, glorify God,' with 3.1f., 'Ye wives, be in subjection to your husbands that if any obey not the word, they may be won, while they behold your chaste conversation.' The latter verse has κερδαίνω. This leads to the third consideration. Nowadays we distinguish rather sharply between mission proper, the 'winning over' of unbelievers, and what in German is called *innere Mission*, the 'winning back' of lax and sinning members of the faith. Certainly the difference existed, was seen and had practical consequences even in the earliest Rabbinic period. But when we remember, what I have just adverted to, that there were various degrees of membership of a faith, some in closer, some in vaguer connection with the centre; further, that there must have been constant fluctuation between them, and that the organization of a faith was quite generally not very rigid, we shall hardly expect two absolutely separate vocabularies for the two kinds of mission. (And even nowadays we speak of 'the conversion of a sinner' as well as 'the conversion of a pagan.') In other words, it is most unlikely that the writer using κερδαίνω in Matt. 18.15, with reference to the 'winning back of a sinner,' would have hesitated to use it, as Paul and I Peter do, with reference to actual 'proselytizing'; and I can think of no reason why the Rabbis, using *niśkar* or *hiśtakker* of the 'winning back of sinning and doomed Israelites,' should have avoided the term in speaking of 'missionizing' proper. However, even if we proceed from the former, narrower application, it is at least clear that when κερδαίνω became a missionary term in early Christianity, it was far from unsuitable. As a rendering of *niśkar* or *hiśtakker* it was a good choice.

This concludes my case. It may be permissible, however, to add a conjecture regarding the background of I Cor. 9.19. In that series of Rabbinic texts where we meet with the Hebrew verb in the sense of 'to win men,' we find the antithesis: God lets himself be conquered — in order to win (Hithpael) the masses (*'okhloza'*). Paul in I Cor. 9.19, while free, makes himself a servant — that he might win (κερδαίνω) the more (τοὺς πλείονας). Is this no more than a coincidence? It need be no more. Neither line of thought is far-fetched; there are parallels outside the New Testament and Rabbinic writings; Goldsmith hit upon something like it when he entitled his play 'She Stoops to Conquer.' Yet there is too specific a similarity between Paul and the Rabbinic texts to make coincidence the more probable solution. If we do not accept it, the problem of date arises. Now the Rabbinic texts in question are late, R. Ishmael b. Jose, a contemporary of Judah the Prince, being the earliest authority named. But, for one thing, various authorities connect the antithesis with various sections in Scripture. This indicates, though it does not prove, that the idea as such is earlier than these authorities, applying it each in his own way. For another thing, it is impossible to assume that the Rabbis drew on Paul's epistles in this matter. Quite apart from other arguments, I Cor. 9.19 was far too remote from and unimportant for the Rabbis. There is a further detail conceivably pointing to Paul's sources. He tells, in vv. 20–22, how 'unto the Jews I became as a Jew, to them that are under the law as under the law,' and so on. Of Hillel, in addition to his well known 'Keep not aloof from the congregation' (M. Aboth 2.5), we possess a mysterious saying preserved in only one place (T. Berakoth 2.24): 'Do not appear naked, do not appear dressed, do not appear laughing, do not appear weeping — as it is said in Ec. 3.4f., A time to weep and a time to laugh, a time to embrace and a time to refrain from embracing.' The position of the saying in the Tosefta shows that, by the time it was incorporated, it was treated as concerning seemly conduct. Certainly, its descendants in Derekh Eretz Rabba 8.4 and D.E. Zuta 5.5 are rules of etiquette. The former passage runs: 'A man should not be joyful among the weeping, nor weep among the joyful, nor wake among the sleeping, nor sleep among the waking, nor stand among the

sitting, nor sit among the standing — the principle of the matter is, A man should not make different his disposition from that of his fellows or the sons of men.' The latter passage is substantially the same, with two exceptions: a definitely Jewish pair of warnings has been added, 'nor should he read Scripture among those reading Mishnah, nor Mishnah among those reading Scripture,' while the summing up reads, 'A man should not differ from the usage of the creatures.' The theme is etiquette, and exclusively Jewish elements are creeping in. But may Hillel's utterance, when first formulated, not have been meant as a piece of advice for those dealing with prospective proselytes? His own practice would have been consistent with it, and it would be easily intelligible why, in the hands of later generations, it became a rule of decent behavior. I may mention that, in my view, Rom. 12.15, 'Rejoice with them that do rejoice, and weep with them that weep,' most probably concerns relations with non-Christians or sinners, though it would lead too far afield here to present my reasons. If there is any substance in all this, the entire passage I Cor. 9.19–23 may be more indebted to a traditional missionary scheme than one would think at first sight. In any case, as for the clause 'I made myself servant — that I might gain the more,' it seems arguable that either Paul was inspired by some version of the Rabbinic antithesis extant in the texts quoted, or at the lowest computation, Paul, in a verse with κερδαίνω, created an antithesis sufficiently Rabbinic in character to remind us of one created by the Rabbis, in an exegesis using *hiśtakker*.

JONATHAN SCOTT'S "BRIEF VIEW"

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"To ENTER upon a Controversy in Things of Religion, without due Consideration and weighty Cause for it, is doubtless sinful. . . . How much Cause there is at this Time to attempt a Vindication of the Doctrines and Practices of our holy Religion, and oppose Error and Disorder, may be manifest by duly attending to the following Treatise: and as to my entering upon this Attempt, I think I may say, it was not hasty and without Consideration. I had early Knowledge of the rising of the Cloud which has covered our Heavens and darkened our Air." [1] So, in the year 1784, the Reverend Jonathan Scott of Yarmouth, Nova Scotia, stated the motives which led him to write, A Brief View of the Religious Tenets and Sentiments Lately Published and Spread in the Province of Nova Scotia, which are contained in a Book, entitled, "Two Mites on Some of the most important and much disputed Points of Divinity, etc.," and in a "Sermon Preached at Liverpool, Nov. 19, 1782," and in a Pamphlet, entitled, "The Antitraditionist," All being Publications of Mr. Henry Alline, with some Brief Reflections and Observations, also a View of the Ordination of the Author of these Books, together with a Discourse on External Order. Such a formidable title in itself offers an outline of an almost forgotten chapter in the history of Canadian thought and literature. Here at the very threshold of British dominion in Canada, while the homeless loyalists from the former colonies were still living in tents at Shelbourne, or encamped in the church at Annapolis Royal, is evidence of a battle of books which is most unexpected at such an early date. Certainly, two sizable volumes of speculative theology, and an answering tome of apologetics; two printed sermons, the preaching of which must have caused the hour glass to be turned more than twice, and a collection of original

[1] Jonathan Scott, A Brief View (Halifax, Printed by John Howe, in Barrington Street, 1784, pp. viii, 334, 21 cm.), v. Copies of this rare work may be found in the Congregational Library, Boston, and in the Library of Acadia University, Wolfville, N. S.

hymns and spiritual songs, is no mean output for the rival printing-presses of John Howe and Anthony Henry, in a day when the population of the entire province was less than twenty thousand. That this early literary movement has been largely overlooked by later historians is due to both Tory excellence and Tory prejudice.

The loyalist intelligensia who came to the province after the American Revolution were not interested in theology, especially "Yankee" theology. Their press, in the words of a later observer, "wanders from the mysteries of pickled fish and winter wheat, from similies upon old women, and touches of metropolitan satire, to disquisitions on the lore of the ancients and general views of the practice of modern empires." [2] Politically and socially, the loyalists were inclined to despise the humble New England farmers and fishermen, who had come to the province fifteen years before the outbreak of the Revolution, and to assume that British North American culture began with the evacuation of New York. Actually, the loyalists themselves were far more influenced by pre-loyalist ideas than they realized. While the theological and metaphysical elements in the writings of Scott and Alline were soon replaced by the worldly wisdom of *Sam Slick*, the earlier democratic ideas of Congregationalists and the importance placed upon feeling in religion held an unquestionable attraction for the new and disillusioned inhabitants. Consciously or unconsciously, they discerned that here in the backwoods, during the war, the earlier settlers had evolved a type of religion adaptable to the needs of the frontier. So far from being merely a copy of the New England way, this Nova Scotian religion was, in part, a revolt against it. It was this conflict between the "New Light" and the "Old" which led Jonathan Scott to write A Brief View.

Jonathan Scott was representative of a class of New England minister which became increasingly common in the later half of the eighteenth century. The new, frontier communities which sprang up after the French and Indian Wars often found it difficult to secure or maintain a graduate of Harvard or Yale as their pastor. Accustomed to rely upon their own resourcefulness in other things, they saw no reason why they should not take religious

[2] Captain W. Moorsom, of the 52nd. Infantry, Letters from Nova Scotia (London, 1830), 81.

affairs into their own hands. In the words of the special presbytery which ordained Mr. Bruin Romcas Comingoe, an uneducated farmer, to minister to a Dutch Reformed congregation at Lunenburg, Nova Scotia, in 1770, "Bonus textuarius est bonus Theologus." [3] Given an upright character and an ability to speak in public, college education could be dispensed with. The result was a growing number of "farmer-ministers," threshing oats on weekdays and threshing sinners on Sunday. Mr. Scott was the second such minister in Yarmouth.

In the year 1770, the Congregational Church of Jebogue, Yarmouth, was gravely divided over the ministry of Squire John Frost, whom part of the congregation had insisted on ordaining to be their pastor.[4] During the crisis, Jonathan Scott, a young farmer with a small family, was asked to conduct public worship for one of the factions in the half finished Jebogue meeting-house. This he did so acceptably that, after two years, the people united in requesting him to become their pastor, and sent him to New England to seek ordination at the hands of an ecclesiastical council which met at Middleborough, Massachusetts, April 27, 1772.[5] Returning to Nova Scotia, the new pastor strove to build up his little charge. "I may say with truth and sincerity," he wrote, "that a considerable part of my support, and that of my family, has been procured by means of constant labor with my hands. . . . A considerable part of them are poor people, which it would not give a compassionate shepherd much satisfaction to get a living out of them." [6] He also struggled conscientiously to improve his education. There is something heroic about this pioneer preacher, toiling on his rocky farm all day, and then at night, as the cold Fundy fogs rolled down over Cape Forchu, lighting his candles and poring over the dim pages of President Willard's Expository Lectures on the Shorter Catechism, or Stoddard's, Safety of Appearing in the Righteousness of Christ, Edwards' Religious Affections, or "the

[3] John Seccomb, A Sermon preached at Halifax. July 3, 1770, at the Ordination of Rev. Bruin Romcas Comingoe, etc. (Halifax, A. Henry, 1770).

[4] Records of Church of Jebogue, 14ff. *MS* in the Public Archives of Nova Scotia. The first 263 pages of this valuable document were written by Rev. J. Scott.

[5] Ibid., 33ff. Jonathan Scott was born at Lunenberg, Mass., Oct. 12, 1744, and moved to Yarmouth in 1764. See, "Rev. Jonathan Scott's Family Bible," The Mayflower Descendant (1906).

[6] Scott, A Brief View, 227.

holy Mr. Flavel's" Character of an Evangelical Pastor.[7] The system of doctrine and church government, which he found in the Westminster Confession of Faith and in the Cambridge Platform of 1648, reappeared in the faith and order of the Church of Jebogue. With meticulous care and excusable pride he wrote with his own hand the Records of the church, which more than any other single document throws light into the lingering shadows of Puritanism in Nova Scotia. Cases of discipline, involving "Dancing and Frolicking with loose Company," "unsavory Talk," "neglect of the Worship of God in the Family," "tolerating a Child in her Disobedience," and "opposing a Husband with bitter Words," were the subjects of endless deliberations in congregational meetings, and of lengthy letters, filled with scriptural admonitions, written to the recalcitrant sinners by their pastor. So it might have continued for years, had it not been for the preaching and writings of Rev. Henry Alline of Falmouth, Nova Scotia.

Rumors of the havoc wrought by this New Light preacher had reached Yarmouth long before the "Ravager" himself visited the township. In 1777, he had "gained a party in Cornwallis . . . which is one of the principal towns in the Province, except Halifax. . . . and from this Number that our Author drew off from the first Church and Congregation in Cornwallis, there was a party drawn off by the influence of the Anabaptists: so that there was a Separation from the Separation."[8] Scott had an opportunity of witnessing this disruption, as he spent five months supplying the pulpit of the First Church in Cornwallis during the winter of 1778–79.

Alline had next appeared in Annapolis County, "where he gained a considerable Party out of the Church and Congregation of Rev. Mr. Morse. . . . The people thus gained are under the conduct of Mr. Handley Chipman."[9] "On the 29th July, following (1779), the poor Church of Maugerville sent a Letter to Yarmouth, requesting our Help under their Difficulties, as they had

[7] All these books and some twenty others are quoted in A Brief View. A few years before his ordination, however, Scott had never even seen a copy of the Westminster Confession. Ibid., 286.

[8] Ibid., 219.

[9] Ibid., 219. For the other side of the story one should read, The Life and Journal of the Rev. Mr. Henry Alline (Boston, Gilbert & Dean, 1806).

no Pastor." The letter stated that "there hath Division and Contention arisen among us, issuing in an open Separation and setting up an independent Church on a different System," and was signed by some of the "most rational, exemplary and Christian men that are on the River." Scott was unable to comply with their request, and sadly notes "They are broken and divided in a melancholy Manner." [10]

Meanwhile, there came into the hands of the Jebogue pastor a copy of Alline's first book, Two Mites on Some of the most Important and much Disputed Points of Divinity, printed by A. Henry at Halifax, N. S., early in the year 1781.[11] He read it with increasing amazement and rage. "What Mysteries are here!" he cried. "Did there ever the like mysterious Jargon, and profound Nonsense drop from the Lips or Pen of any Man that had the Exercise of Reason before?" [12] Not only was the author guilty of dividing churches and leading men to be "covenant-breakers," he was also poisoning their minds with doctrines that were not scriptural. That, to Jonathan Scott, was the most deadly of all sins. He said nothing publicly about the new book, however, until, one memorable Sunday morning in October, 1781, looking out over his congregation, he saw a dark stranger in their midst. Henry Alline had arrived in Yarmouth.

In the next few days, the itinerant gave two public discourses in Yarmouth; and on his return from Liverpool, Nova Scotia, February, 1782, he preached eighteen or nineteen times in thirteen days. "In this space of thirteen Days," bitterly remarks Scott, "the People of my Charge appeared to be under his Influence entirely: insomuch that excepting four or five Persons only, none advised, or took any Direction or Counsel of me, or so much as came to my House on the Occasion, no more than if I had been a Person whom they ought not to advise with about any of their religious Concerns. . . . Under these Circumstances, to see the People to whom I stood related under the Influence of such a *Person*, and such *Measures* as were taken with them; while they

[10] Scott, A Brief View, 220.

[11] This book was reprinted under the auspices of the Free Will Baptists at Dover, N. H., 1804, under the title, Two Mites Cast into the Offering of God for the Benefit of Mankind.

[12] Scott, A Brief View, 162.

in their Conduct and Speeches, applauded and caressed their Leader; and discovered in their Carriage and Behaviour, as well as in their Speeches, to my Face, and behind my Back, many of them, that I was the greatest Obstacle and Hindrance in the Way of their spiritual and eternal Good: censuring and condemning my publick Discourses, as pointed, bitter, killing Discourses, because they did not agree with the Principles, Practices and Work of our Author: *anyone may easily conclude that it was a Trial.*" [13]

The result of this controversy was that some of the members of the Jebogue Church began to hold separate meetings in their homes. When their pastor tried to discipline them in the old way, by citing them before the church for "unnecessary forsaking the assembling with the Church for publick Worship," they answered, "with great Confidence and every Appearance of Contempt," "You have the Form of Godliness, but deny the Power: and from such I am commanded to turn away (2 Timothy 3:5)." To his dismay, Jonathan Scott discovered that "all Covenants, Vows, Promises and Engagements, are trampelled upon as Dirt and Mire." [14]

It was because of such grevious provocation, no other champion having come to the defence of orthodoxy and order, that the Yarmouth pastor decided to write an exposure of Henry Alline's errors and character. Two more of the latter's writings, A Sermon Preached at Liverpool, and The Anti-Traditionist, had reached Jebogue. Their theology was even more extreme than that of Two Mites. Scott planned his attack with care. A Brief View is well organized, logical and solidly based on authority. In comparison with Alline's flights of eloquence, it is slow moving, but its prosiness is lightened by the constant intrusion of personalities into the argument, sometimes, indeed, the reader scarcely knows whether to smile or gasp at the pastor's command of sarcasm and invective.

With Calvin, Scott begins his argument by taking his stand upon the authority of the scriptures. "The System of revealed

[13] Ibid., 227. Alline says that Scott's "religion would very easily suffer him to get in a passion, and call me an impudent fellow: which caused me to tell him, that he shewed what kingdom he belonged to by his rage and malice." Life and Journal, 151.

[14] Scott, A Brief View, 239ff., outlines the case against Mr. Cornelius Rogers. Cf., Records of Church of Jebogue, 201ff.

Truths and Doctrines contained in the Bible, are the Foundations of the Church of God. . . . Erase the Foundation, and the Church of God on Earth, as to its Visibility at least, is extinguished." [15] With true pioneer resourcefulness, he applies the language of the frontier to theological dogma: "None might promise themselves Salvation, had not God made a Grant of Conveyance, nor has any a right Claim to eternal Salvation but only upon Conditions stated in the Bible. . . . It is the Note of a true Saint to esteem the Word of God." From this premise, it follows logically, that "the most effectual Way to waste and ruin the Church of God and Interest of Religion in the World is by corrupting the Truth and Simplicity of the Doctrines of the Holy Scriptures, thereby destroying the Foundation." [16] In fourteen sections or chapters, Scott then demonstrates how the teachings and practices of Henry Alline are unscriptural and are, therefore, false and destructive. Twelve of the sections are devoted to an examination of Two Mites, and one section to the Liverpool Sermon and The Anti-Traditionist respectively. Each of these sections is prefaced by a number of direct quotations from the work in question, so that like the heresy of Celsus, if one did not have Alline's own works, his teachings would still be known through the writings of his adversary.

Scott first attacks Alline's denial of the doctrine that the Almighty in the beginning, "created, or made the World and all Things in it, out of Nothing." After ridiculing the idea of creating something out of nothing, Alline had made the idea of a pre-existent substance, exhaled from God, the basis of one of his most novel arguments. "If God," he said, "is thus infinite, immense, there cannot be any empty Void, or Room, where God is not, for he must be Everywhere, and therefore it is impossible for any Thing to be made out of Nothing." The physical world and all living things are simply manifestations, or emanations (Alline does not use this word) of the Divine essence.

> Through the whole Chain of Revelation you hear of God being in Heaven, and of the Kingdom of Heaven; which is the Kingdom of God, sometimes called his Pavillion, and sometimes the everlasting Hills; and

[15] Scott, A Brief View, 6.
[16] Ibid., 9.

holding forth his Residence, or everlasting Out-birth; but let not my Reader imagine these created, or corporeal Heavens, or any Place made for his Residence, but what he was from Eternity possessed of, in and of himself: and therefore, from this eternal Kingdom, Pavillion, or Out-birth, Adam and all angelick Beings derive their Cloathing or Out-birth, or paradisical Kingdom.[17]

Man before the Fall, according to this hypothesis, therefore, did not have a physical body, but was a part of "an innumerable Cloud, or angelick System, standing between the Means of Confirmation and Apostacy called two Trees, the one of Life, the other of Death: the Knowledge of Evil; but not as many vainly imagine them, corporeal Trees, for I cannot as yet be so imposed upon as to believe, that this Son of God stood in continual Need of sweet and sour Apples." [18]

This mystical doctrine, so quaintly expressed, was actually far more practical than might at first appear. Alline was in revolt against the Calvinistic system which limited the possibility of eternal salvation to the elect, thus narrowing the effect of the atonement to a fraction of humanity, and dimming the idea of the mercy and love of God. By presenting the universe, not in terms of sovereign will, but of divine immanence and human responsibility, a philosophic background was provided for the possibility of universal redemption and the issuing of a gospel call to all mankind. The fall had been a result of man's "falling in love with his paradisical clothing," or IMMORTAL BODY. Sinking farther and farther into a hell of his own making, he had, through the merciful intervention of God, been segregated in a physical body, where for a brief moment he had the opportunity once more, of being redeemed by choosing to have Christ take possession of his inmost soul. "Christ died," said Alline, "not to appease any vindicative Wrath or Satisfy any incensed Justice in the Deity; but to die wholly in and for the fallen Race: to remove Wrath and Hell, and ten-thousand Disorders from them." [19] Such an account of the relationship between God and man was far closer to the

[17] Quoted ibid., 193. This passage is from The Anti-Traditionist, 22. Alline borrowed both the language and the ideas of this passage from the English mystic William Law. Cf. Law's Works (London, 1762), VII, Part ii, 55ff.

[18] Quoted, Scott, A Brief View, 194.

[19] Ibid., 59.

eighteenth century emphasis on natural rights and the dignity of man, than the older theology.

To Jonathan Scott it was downright blasphemy.

> It is to be questioned whether any one, who may not justly be classed with Infidels and Deists, has ever made a bolder Attempt on the sovereign Decrees of God, respecting eternal Election and Predestination, than our Author. . . . We may safely own ourselves Predestinarians if our Bibles teach us so. . . . Poor little Worms of Dust, all covered with Clouds of Ignorance, who are Subjects of the high Decree of their Maker, ought to bow their Souls before him, in Humility and Abasement, submitting their Reason to his Revelation for Light and Guidance, and with the highest Reverence, adore that which we cannot comprehend: and not reply against the Lord, and call his Ways unjust because we cannot fathom them with our short Line of weak and selfish Reason and Conception.[20]

Such arguments as Alline's, were a "limiting of the holy One of Israel," because they made redemption dependent upon man's will, and not God's. In words reminiscent of Jonathan Edward's famous Enfield sermon, Scott roundly declares, "Sinners of Mankind are in the Hand, and at the Disposal of the holy, sovereign God, who dispenses his Favors to Men, according to his holy and righteous Pleasure." [21] "Christ died for a Number short of the whole of Mankind." [22] He denies that individuals may have any knowledge of God's love apart from the words of the Bible. With Edwards, again, he pictures this love as being towards "Beings in general," and therefore, it is "perfectly consistent with all the Threats of the holy Law of God, and the Exercise of vindicative Justice . . . to bear Resentment against Sin and to inflict infinitely dreadful Plagues and Punishments on impenitent Sinners." [23] Indeed, "revenging, incensed, vindicative Justice, is an amiable, bright and glorious Perfection in the most, holy God." The atonement was not the sufferings of a Christ "that was in each and all of the fallen Race, from the Fall of Man to this Time . . . in each one groaning beneath their Guilt," but the actual historic sacrifice to offended justice made upon Calvary. "Mr. Alline will tell the Sinner that God is his Friend. . . . How ready are poor Sinners to believe this, and rejoice on the Account of it, and grow

[20] Ibid., 26ff. [21] Ibid., 46. [22] Ibid., 52. [23] Ibid., 66.

bold and confident in the Belief of a Falsehood, while the Wrath of God abides upon them; as it actually does on all Christless Sinners." [24]

Similarly, Alline's notions of sanctification also draw Scott's fire. The imperfection of the saints in this life was something altogether too patent in both experience and the scriptures to be ignored. Alline attempted to get around it by means of a trichomy of "an animal or elemental Body; a spiritual and immortal Body; and an immortal Mind," [25] corresponding to the physical body man received after the fall and the spiritual or pre-existent body and soul he had before that catastrophe. At conversion Christ "takes possession of the inmost Soul, or immortal Mind, but leaveth the fallen immortal Body in its fallen State still." Henceforth, such imperfections as the saint might exhibit, are due to this unredeemed part of his nature and do not affect the innermost citadel of his soul. As one of Alline's followers said to the Rev. Freeborn Garrettson, "As for sin, it cannot hurt me: not even adultery, murder, swearing, drunkenness, nor any other sin, can break the union between me and Christ." [26]

Scott objected to this antinominian doctrine, not only on the grounds that it had "no Foundation at all in Scripture, nor in Reason, nor anywhere in the Universe," but also because the idea of man's physical body being abandoned to destruction or extinction, while the immortal parts of man, united with Christ, returned to their pre-mundane glory, seemed to strike at the doctrine of the resurrection of the body, upon which, he believed, "the Truth and Certainty of the whole Christian Religion depends." "It is such an horrible Assertion," he cried, "to say, that the elemental Bodies shall be burnt up and dissolved never to rise: for then shall the Saints never have any Reward in that Body which has been devoted to the Service of Christ." [27]

Enough has been said to show the difference in viewpoint between the two Nova Scotian theologians. Alline was in his own words an "anti-traditionist," interested in experimental religion, and reaching out into mystical and speculative philosophy for an

[24] Ibid., 84. [25] Alline, Two Mites, 134ff.

[26] Nathan Bangs, The Life of the Rev. Freeborn Garrettson (New York, 1834), 165.

[27] Scott, A Brief View, 95.

intellectual basis for his teaching. In contrast, Scott was a traditionalist, rigidly adhering to the thought-forms of the past. The two differed equally violently on the question of church ordinances and discipline. Alline, emphasizing spiritual liberty, was inclined to minimize the importance of man-made regulations, and to value spontaneous, religious acts above outward forms of worship. This was especially true of his ideas concerning ordination and baptism, two very controversial subjects in pre-loyalist Nova Scotia. Like Whitefield, Tennent, and other revivalists before him, he stressed the need of a converted ministry. "Darkness cannot give Light, or Ice make a Man warm," [28] therefore, the important thing was not proper ordination at the hands of men, but an outpouring of the Spirit of God. Believers were warned to fly from the company of unconverted ministers, "as from the concealed Murderers of Souls, or undiscovered Jaws of eternal Perdition." [29]

Scott's answer to this is, that "a Spirit of Pride, Ignorance and Self-Sufficiency lies at the Bottom of all, which disposes them to overlook and neglect the Help of both God and Man." [30] He devotes sections VII, VIII, and XVI, the latter being a careful examination of Alline's own ordination by a group of New Light laymen, assisted by "Mr. Persons, Minister of the Anabaptist Society in Horton," at Falmouth, Nova Scotia, April 6, 1779. As a Congregationalist, Scott could not deny the right of laymen to ordain, without clerical assistance, in cases of necessity; but he objected to this particular ordination, firstly, because he felt that Alline was not a proper character for ordination, and secondly, because he had no call from any particular church, but had been ordained "an itinerant Preacher to enter any of our Flocks without our Consent, and get as many of his Party as he can, and sow his horrible Doctrines, and introduce his disorderly Practices, and slander and revile such as do not see fit to countenance him in his Proceedings." [31] For such an ordination there is no authority "either natural or divine."

Scott returns to this subject, which naturally touched him very closely, in the last section of his book (XVII), which is "A Discourse on the Necessity and Importance of external Order in the

[28] Alline, Two Mites, 159.
[29] Ibid., 171ff.
[30] Scott, A Brief View, 113.
[31] Ibid., 284.

Church of God, and Things of Religion: with a particular Enquiry whether a Minister of the Gospel has Right and Authority to enter into the Charge of another, and exercise his ministerial Authority therein, without Consent for his so doing." This discourse was really a sermon he had prepared during the crisis in Yarmouth, but had been advised by his deacons not to preach. There is something pathetic about the pastor, viewing the wreckage of his congregation after the visit of the itinerant, and penning these words:

> Christ's Order is the Hedge which he has erected about his Church and Ordinances, as a suitable Means of Safety and Preservation . . . Look, wherever, you see the Hedge and Bulwark of divine Order broke down from about any Church or professing People, you may write Ichabod there, the Glory is departed." [32]

In both ordination and baptism, Scott felt that Alline had deliberately slighted ordinances instituted by the Word of God.[33]

The sections devoted to A Sermon Preached to and at the Request of a religious Society of young Men, united and engaged for the maintaining and enjoying of religious Worship in Liverpool, on the 19th., of November, 1782 (Halifax, Printed by A. Henry, 1782?), and to Alline's last theological work, The Anti-Traditionist,[34] add nothing new to the argument. The Liverpool sermon, directed against the theological dogma of imputed righteousness, sets forth Alline's own ideas of a Redeemer working "for and in the fallen race." It is filled with extravagant and emotional language, and Scott felt it to be "a home Stroke to take off the Edge and Force of all the Threats of the divine Law." [35] "It is very easy," he remarks, "for our Author to make Proselytes to his own Party, if he can make poor, unthinking, inconsiderate Souls believe that God is not angry with them. . . . When they believe this Falsehood, then can they love God, and be confident that he loves them; but the Bottom and Foundation of all is Deception."

Of The Anti-Traditionist, which carried Alline's peculiar views to much greater extremes than Two Mites, Scott says:

[32] Ibid., 330.

[33] Alline felt that water-baptism was a non-essential, "of no more importance than it does good." Two Mites, 258ff.

[34] There is no place or date of publication indicated in this pamphlet, it is printed in very close and poor type and probably appeared at Halifax, early in the year 1783.

[35] Scott, A Brief View, 183.

There are seventy Pages in this Pamplet . . . but in order to have given a full Idea of all the absurd, bold, ridiculous, censorious and nonsensical Assertions and Representations that are therein, in Opposition to divine Revelation and the Dictates of Reason, the whole pamphlet must have been transcribed; which would not be for Edification. . . . This Performance is stored with a greater Proportion of Poetry than *Two Mites, etc.*, calculated to raise the Passions, while the rational Mind . . . is bewildered with the dark, mysterious, unintelligible Matter contained in it." [36]

Having shown, to his own satisfaction, how Alline's teachings as exhibited in his writings, are unscriptural and therefore subversive to true religion, Scott has no difficulty in proving that the errorist's practices are equally reprehensible. Most of this evidence is presented in Section XV, and is largely reproduced in the historical portions of this essay. It is particularly valuable for the light it throws upon the early social and religious history of Nova Scotia.

Scott attributes Alline's success to the want of settled ministers and proper schools in the province.

Many if not the greatest Part of the Towns and Settlements in this Land have no Ministers to teach or instruct them, and a Number of small Settlements and Villages never had any settled Gospel minister, or constant Teaching in the Things of Religion, since this Land was inhabited by the English. . . . And many Places are much wanting in Schools for the Instruction of Youth, either in the Principles of Religion or human Literature: and this Want of Instruction has been of more than twenty years standing; so that the Youth in many Places, for want of proper and needful Instruction are much exposed, and are ready to take in and become exceeding fond of, and established in the Belief of the Sentiments which we have taken a brief View of in the foregoing Essay.[37]

That there is a need for a "Reformation of Religion" in Nova Scotia and "a loud Call for Magistrates, Ministers, Heads of Families, and all sorts of People to exert themselves in their proper Stations, and use their Influence to promote it, and to suppress the Growth and Increase of Vice and Prophaneness," is plain to all.

The great Want and Neglect of Family Religion, Instruction and Government, that is to be found in this Land, the prophane Swearing,

[36] Ibid., 204.
[37] Ibid., 206–207.

Intemperance, Sabbath-breaking, Uncleanness, vain Company-keeping, and spending time at Taverns and Games: together with the Unconcernedness, Carelessness and deep Security about religious and Concerns, that is seen manifest among People, makes our Circumstances with respect to Religion to appear very gloomy.[38]

Scott admits that "among young People there have been a Number that have quitted their prophaneness, as I hope, and some Extravagance of Dress, . . . and have appeared to be awakened and seriously concerned about their Souls and the Things of Religion."

Yet, (they) have been led into Parties and Separations, and such other Absurdities and Irregularities and wild Imaginations, as have in fact given a deeper Wound to Religion, and prejudiced the Minds of People against it more than all their former Prophaneness and Carelessness ever had done.[39]

The impression that Scott leaves with one of the state of religion in Nova Scotia at the conclusion of the Revolutionary War is indeed discouraging. "Persons that have Understanding . . . may be warranted not to join or have any Connection with such who, with Joab's Kiss, join a fatal Thrust, and shed out the Bowels of true Religion and Godliness upon the Ground and leave it wallowing in its own Gore, as it is at this day in many Places in this Province. . . . Not only is our Land overspread with Tenets and Principles, which . . . overthrow and destroy the Truths and doctrines of divine Revelation; but also this Province is overspread with religious Contentions, Divisions, and Seperations; so that there is scarce a Church or religious Community . . . but what our Author has broke in upon and drawn off a Party from it by some Means or other." [40]

People, that are at a Distance, when they shall read this Book (Two Mites), and see the glaring Absurdities, Inconsistencies, Mysteries, Blasphemies, Railleries, and Profound Nonsense and ridiculous Insinuations, that are to be found therein, may be inclined to think and say, 'This Performance will never do Hurt among any People that are favored with, and have the least Veneration for the holy Bible; for it is so open and manifest that none will embrace it, nor the Author of it, until he

[38] Ibid., 255. [39] Ibid., 256. [40] Ibid., 216ff.

openly retracts from those Sentiments.' But we who have been Eye, and Ear Witnesses of the Effects and Prevalency of this Performance, can testify to the Contrary. Indeed, sober understanding Persons Abroad, both Ministers and private Christians, that have had Opportunity to observe the Malignity, Subtilty and Power of a Spirit of Error, and wild Imagination, will be able to form some suitable Ideas of our State and Circumstances in this Land; and I hope and trust will be excited to pity and pray for us.[41]

Professor Rufus Jones in Mysticism and Democracy speaks of the attempt of the common man to create a religion after his own heart.[42] The pre-loyalist literature of Nova Scotia is an expression of this perennial longing. From the point of view of logic, Jonathan Scott probably has the best of his adversary, and proves the reasonableness of the established order. But he lacked imagination, and his argument is too often merely an appeal to authority. The fact remains that the older churches had been unable to meet the religious and emotional needs of the frontier. Henry Alline, on the other hand, though venturesome and eloquent, was limited by his lack of education, and the nature of the metaphysical concepts he tried to grasp. As his opponent points out, his writings "abound greatly with bold, barefaced Assertions, and mysterious, uncouth, and unintelligible Sentences, which it is not at all likely that the Author understands himself."[43] Nevertheless, in his fumbling way, he grasped the religious need of his time and struck at the fear which was at the heart of the common man. His failure to acknowledge the sources of his ideas, as well as his intolerance of those, like Scott, who disagreed with him is regretable, but his efforts to supply his destitute countrymen with a living religion which met their needs and enlisted their support, entitled him to be numbered among the founders of Canadian churches. The books summarized in A Brief View mark the emergence of a new, indigenous and democratic religion on the eastern frontier.[44]

[41] Ibid., 168.

[42] Rufus M. Jones, Mysticism and Democracy in the English Commonwealth (Cambridge, Mass., 1932), 147.

[43] Scott, A Brief View, 167.

[44] Alline died at North Hampton, N. H., Feb. 2, 1784. Scott continued to fight a losing battle against the forces of enthusiasm in Yarmouth until 1792, when he removed to Minot, Maine, where he continued in the active ministry until his death. American church historians speak of him as "one of whom any body might be proud,

than whom no minister in Maine has left a deeper mark of piety and zeal in his Master's work." — J. Weston, "History of the Association of Ministers of Cumberland County, Maine," The Congregational Quarterly (Oct. 1867), 342. They also state that he published twelve sermons after he moved to Maine, but there is no mention whatever of A Brief View. Cf., Emerson Davis, Biographical Sketches of the Congregational Pastors of New England. (MS. in Congregational Library, Boston), III, 310–311.